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The collection of essays offered in this volume contains some of the ideas that came out of the brainstorming and the long and insightful conversations that were held in various European 
cities. Whether it was in Bratislava, Budapest, Prague, Warsaw and 
of course istanbul, the authors engaged in a process that could best 
be described as looking for a way out of the Turkey-Eu drama. The 
authors could be compared to a very atypical group of passengers 
who found themselves in the same carriage of a train that was speed-
ing towards a point where the track might end. some of them were 
searching for a way to stop the train and bring it back to a junction 
from where they could travel more safely to the desired destination. 
others were convinced that there was no way to stop it and they were 
rather trying to see how to build a new track so that the train could 
carry on.
While several approaches were employed in this brainstorming, 
their common denominator was constructive optimism: an effort to 
deconstruct the clichés and outline concrete steps that needed to 
be taken to overcome the crisis in Eu-Turkey negotiations. The two 
main characters that are the subjects of these essays could in fact 
compete in the disciplines of being complicated, stubborn and un-
predictable. hence our level of analysis also has more layers and the 
thoughts and the evidence presented in the articles range from focus-
ing on the role of media, to analyzing “technical” aspects such as the 
institutional preparedness of both players to make policy-oriented 
remarks dealing with the current state of the negotiations and what 
was expected of the Czech presidency of the European union.
The bottom line of the texts you are about to read is that, despite 
the complexity, both Turkey and the EU must find a way to live and 
work together – if not for a noble reason then at least for a purely 
pragmatic one: they still have a lot of common enemies. 
it was not an easy endeavor for the authors of this collection to 
put together some rational and forward-looking remarks on this sub-
ject. What once (not long ago in fact) used to be interesting, even a bit 
8exotic, and a promising story with an almost inevitable happy end-
ing, quickly turned into something like a taboo. discussions among 
academics, think-tankers and journalists, – or should we say, orga-
nized discussions, such as workshops and conferences, on this topic 
have become trendy over the past few years. But when a less subtle 
“yes-or-no” question is posed, most participants just look aside and 
utter “no, it will not happen”. The trust between the two sides of the 
equation has evaporated. Turks are likely to say “i don’t believe the 
Eu is serious with us” the Eu-peans keep repeating “i don’t believe 
the Turks are serious with the reforms”.
in such an atmosphere, it takes a lot of motivation to think pro-
gressively and look on the bright side. Thus, most people dealing 
with the subject are likely to conclude, off –the record, that they are 
in fact tired of the whole story and would like to read or watch some-
thing new. After hours of drama, even if artistically well conceived 
and reflecting a serious social phenomenon, there is a secret desire 
for a kitsch comedy. 
yet why are these expressions of hopelessness more often than 
not off the record? For in fact a very simple reason: all hope has not 
been lost yet. The recurring efforts of various individuals and groups 
and institutions to search for a way to restart the Turkish Eu journey 
are solid proof that the relationship of the two intransigents is not 
something hatched in the heat of the moment, but a very natural and 
vital bond. It will not be forgotten, it just needs to be fixed.
now, it is clear why these conversations have taken place in istan-
bul, but where do the four Central European capitals fit in the pic-
ture? don’t the “newly European” member states have enough dreary 
issues of their own to deal with? yes they do but – and that is perhaps 
the best answer for the curious reader – during their own very recent 
accession experience they have learned that an inward-oriented ap-
proach to policy-making is not an option if they want to be success-
ful. And the approach of “first deal with things domestic then come 
to things foreign” as well does not seem to be an alternative.
moreover, in a painful process of disentangling themselves from 
their authoritarian pasts and coming to terms with the pros and cons 
of becoming sovereign states with market economies and the rule of 
law, and at the same time striving to find their place back on a world 
(or at least European) map, they have learned a very tough lesson 
on what it means to be an outsider. having this experience, their 
understanding of Turkey’s backsliding on its own promises as well 
9as Turkey’s fights with the EU, is authentic, not formal. It is not a 
coincidence that new members have a more pro-future-enlargement 
spirit than old ones. 
yet the enlargement-friendly spirit sometimes stays behind the 
door when it comes to making or, what is more important, initiat-
ing decisions in the Eu arena. most observers conclude that when it 
comes to controversial issues many of the new tend to be conspicu-
ously timid, more often than not walking in the footsteps of the older 
and the bigger. Thus, one of the recommendations of this volume is 
for new Eu members to amplify their voices in Eu politics on issues 
beyond budget and agricultural subsidies. 
The problem however lies also on the other side of the equation 
– Turkey itself at times tends to underestimate the allies it could gain 
among Europe’s newcomers. overemphasizing the rhetoric of “the 
big” it whips itself into depression over a cold and grudging Eu, over-
looking the friends it has among those whose hour of influence has 
yet to come. And so these essays are also an effort to refocus the 
Turkey Eu debate onto a ground as yet almost untouched by serious 
consideration: to look at how the country can benefit from learning 
from the successes and mistakes of Central European Eu accessions.
The collection starts with contribution of hurriyet daily news 
editor-in-chief david Judson, who in his essay looks on what media 
can and cannot do in breaking the obvious communication divide 
between the Eu and Turkey. Then we follow with four articles look-
ing at EU decision-making vis-à-vis Turkey. Adam Szymański writes 
about the Eu’s fears vis-à-vis Turkish membership and suggests 
some policies the Eu had better employ now. david král looks at 
what could be expected from the Czech Eu presidency and deniz 
Bingol mcdonald and Peter Balazs analyze the roles of conditional-
ity and public opinion in enlargement. Ceren Ak, sylvia Tiryaki and 
mensur Akgün evaluate the union’s approach after last year’s evalu-
ation report. We close the volume by another reflection – an essay on 
“talking Turkey” in slovakia or what it takes to mainstream a seem-








it will surely happen. in some distant future, historians and arche-ologists will show up from whatever civilization emerges in the 31st Century from the post-mordial sea created by global warming 
in the 21st. They will want to come back and excavate the ancient 
civilization that embarked in the middle of the 20th Century upon a 
project to create the first semblance of continental unity in Europe 
since the romans.
in our time, the standard rule of thumb for archeologists probing 
a lost civilization in some place like Turkey – where i happen to live 
and where there remain many unexplored roman ruins – is to start 
in what they suppose to have been the northwest corner. This has al-
ways fascinated me, for knowing nothing about archeology my own 
impulse would be to look first for the emperor’s palace or the senate. 
But archeologists don’t think this way. They want to first probe into 
the likely intersection of intellectual and political life, understand 
the rules of commerce, examine how the rich interacted with the 
poor and find the symbolic heart of this “lost civilization.” In short, 
they want to begin with the basic “narrative.”
so, at least when digging in Turkey, the best bet is to start at the 
northwest corner. Archeologists are not quite sure why. Perhaps be-
cause of prevailing winds this section was saved from the stench of 
iron Age hygiene. or perhaps due to the advantage given by this geog-
raphy to view the stars, this is where the thinkers came. in any event, 
this is where the presumed “action” was. For whatever reason, here 
is where one is deemed most likely to find the most interesting stuff. 
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To complete my tenuous metaphor, where will be the retrospec-
tive “northwest corner” of the European union 10 centuries hence? 
Were i to advise the team coming back to the ruins of the Eu to dig 
for clues, i would advise against starting in Brussels. For starters, any 
records remaining will be coded in the cuneiform code of Eurojargon 
(just what did they mean by “comitology?” they will wonder.) second-
ly, what little evidence of culture exists in Brussels today will surely 
be long obliterated. lastly, Brussels is hardly where the meek and the 
mighty of the Eu ever really interact. never mind any discussion of 
intellectual life. The “narrative” will not be found here.
no, my advice to the future would be to commence this continen-
tal dig in Prague. in this case, it is not in the northwest corner of the 
Eu, a distinction belonging to denmark’s Faroe islands. in fact it is 
at the very center of the Eu if we include the accessionary hopefuls; 
given the 1,000 years i am allowing this exercise, this does not seem 
too presumptuous about the pace with which these matters of acces-
sion will proceed.
in any event, this should be the spot where the “narrative” of 
the European project suddenly unraveled and disappeared. in other 
words, late 2008 and early 2009 may for our visitors from the distant 
future be the equivalent of 476, when the Barbarians finally did in 
the last roman Emperor. That is unless you prefer the “greater Em-
pire” version of history whereby rome became a goner in 1453 as the 
Turks embarked on their first serious European integration project 
with the sacking of Byzantium. 
What they find does not necessarily have to be a failure scenario. 
Conversely, it may in my analogy be something comparable to 221 
BC, the year the Ch’in first unified the warring dynasties of China. 
more than two millennia without a name change would seem some 
measure of endurance. If what they are to find is success, maybe it 
will be something like 1648. maybe this period we are now going 
through will be viewed by future generations as the equivalent of 
the treaty of Westphalia, which ushered out the 30 years War and 
ushered in the concept of state sovereignty. They got some things 
right back then.
Can the eU redisCover its narrative?
of course the “story” has yet to be decided. For while the Eu nar-
rative has been in deep trouble for some time – for a whole litany of 
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reasons about which you can read in this volume – now, in early 2009 
is where the “narrative” will succeed or fail. is this to be the “rule of 
big states,” the vision of French President nicolas sarkozy, who on 
Jan. 1 pretended to surrender the rotating Eu Presidency only to ef-
fectively snatch it back again with an early January peacemaking visit 
to israel? or is to be something more inclusive, actually giving real 
authority to the first former Warsaw Pact nation, namely the small 
Czech Republic, to be the nominal president for the first six months 
of 2009?
is the Eu to operate as basically an aggegration of crisis manage-
ment tactics, or as an entity with some coherent strategy that gives 
real meaning to the notion of “soft power?” Will the test of wills see 
the triumph of public leadership amidst an economic crisis as ad-
vocated by the Czech Prime minister mirek Topolanek? or will his 
formal partner and informal archrival, Czech President vaclav klaus 
become the one with the vision that wins out, one of deregulation, 
laissez-faire and an EU whose official policy is that “freedom and 
prosperity are much more endangered than the climate?” yes, klaus 
actually said and believes that.
Either the Big Bang is coming at the Eu. or the grand Collapse. 
That the clash – no, not in the Eu, let’s say “extreme cohesional chal-
lenge” – comes amid the concentric circles of an overnight reversal of 
the assumptions dominating global economics for the past 30 years, 
within the worst plunge in markets in 70 years, makes this rather 
dramatic. Hence my notion that Prague would be a fine place to es-
tablish where it all came from, and where it all went, were one to visit 
on a time-travelling site excavation. 
ok. i realize this has been an unorthodox introduction. Be fore-
warned. if you choose to continue it is only going to become more 
so. Just pretend you’re stuck in a crowded train compartment with a 
loqacious American with an inter-rail pass. Be polite. my argument 
is this: the European Union has been losing its narrative, its defining 
story, for some time. suddenly, but from my perspective tragically, 
all the competing symbols, visions and semiotic elements are near 
complete collapse. Today if the Eu narrative were a novel, it would 
be one that begins as an epic in the style of Ernest hemingway or 
John steinbeck. This novel was already losing its theme and focus. 
And now we see it transformed into a work of lewis Carroll. one 
wonders what derogations Carroll’s “Wonderland” might seek during 
the screening phase toward adherence to the communitaire acquis? 
The narrative, or narratives, have just disappeared.
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By profession i am a storyteller. so loss of narratives are disap-
pointing; it must be something like what an environmentalist feels 
when a species disappears into extinction. That the Eu story once 
represented to me something near to the crowning achievement of 
civil mankind makes today’s reality not just disappointing, but tragic. 
so allow me to explain just why i think “narratives” are so important.
in many late night discussions on the nature of the news busi-
ness, i have often found myself advancing the following argument: 
despite the fact we perceive our work as a matter of gathering each 
morning to decide what “stories” we will write in the course of the 
day, the larger reality is something different. rather, it seems to me, 
journalism is more akin to a game of scrabble with a limited number 
of letters on the table. it is our task to pick among them and as-
semble the best word we can. The difference between scrabble and 
journalism, however, is that we don’t pick from among letters lying 
upon the table; we pick from the available “narratives” given us by 
culture and convention. We then cobble them together as the ele-
ments from which to create the day’s news against the contour of this 
template. To move outside an essential narrative is to spell a word 
that the scrabble board has not provided. Therein lies journalism’s 
fundamental dilemma. 
i argue that the same could describe the fast-failing European 
union: the available narratives simply don’t square with the reality. 
said differently, the pieces in the union’s scrabble set fall short of the 
elements needed to construct a narrative. As this line of argument 
relates to my profession, i realize it is not one to be found in any 
journalism textbook. And on more than one occasion i have found 
myself labeled a heretic by my peers for suggesting it. Which only 
proves my point, i will argue. For the notion of heresy cannot really 
exist unless supported by the broader Judeo-Christian narrative of 
morality. 
i again realize the oddity of introducing a set of thoughts on the 
state of the European union, the prospects for Turkey’s development 
within the context of the values represented by the Eu and the rela-
tionship of all this to the newest members of the Eu club. But now 
some three years into a discussion of all this, a conversation hubbed 
through Bratislava by the slovak Foreign Policy Association, i have 
a few thoughts. i am not about to offer bold insight. i have no para-
digms to shift. i can’t even offer up the kernel of an idea that might 
lead to a grant under the terms of the 7th Framework to nurture 
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greater cross-border cohesion in support of multi-cultural dialogue. 
But i have a few ideas i have been asked to share. i should disclose 
that these are the thoughts of an outsider, who runs a newspaper in 
an outcast country. 
Elsewhere, you will find ample analysis of the precipice upon 
which the Turkish-Eu relationship now pivots. The most recent i 
have read is one of the best. “Turkey and Europe: The decisive year 
Ahead,” by the international Crisis group, produced in late 2008. it 
notes that Turkish public support has dropped from a high of 65 per-
cent to a low of 27 percent in one poll in 2007. nationalist sentiment 
is on the rise, and anti-European attitudes have become mainstream, 
the report argues.
From the European side, the growing ill will of the French, the 
germans and others has set in motion a “vicious circle” in which 
“European slights are interpreted by Turkey as reasons to do nothing 
and Turkish inaction is interpreted (in the Eu) as disinterest in the 
Eu.” And downward we collectively spiral.
Without discounting the accuracy of this diagnosis, my view of 
the problem is quite different. it boils down to this: The real crisis 
faced by the EU is not Irish selfishness, French arrogance or Polish 
fecklessness in the face of exception-making to the country’s inclu-
sion in the bounty of the Common Agricultural Policy. rather, it is 
the collapse or disappearance of any coherent “story” as to what the 
Eu is all about. 
From the perspective of a newspaperman in İstanbul, the implica-
tions of this “collapse of narrative” are further confused by the emer-
gence of new and competing anti-narratives. There are those that 
come from within the dialogue, such as Angela merkel’s “privileged 
partnership” or nicolas sarkozy’s “union for the mediterranean;” 
these may well have innocently grown out of sincere initiatives to 
strengthen ties but they are perceived and discussed where i live as 
prototypes of “Plan B”. There are other “Plan B” notions coming from 
outside the dialogue also astir in the collective Turkish conscious-
ness: a “Eurasian” alliance of some kind with the resurgent russia 
that is fast becoming Turkey’s most important trading partner is one. 
Some find the idea of a more robust embrace of “Muslim brethen” 
particularly appealing if it involves siblings with access to a sovereign 
Wealth Fund such as those belonging to kuwait or dubai. i found 
one of the findings in a recent study on political views in Istanbul’s 
sprawling shantytown fascinating. respondents to a survey voiced 
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growing frustration with what they perceived as the hypocrisy of the 
European union; when asked to suggest remedies, most voiced inter-
est in deepening Turkish ties with “Turkic” kinsmen in places like 
Azerbaijan, kazakhstan, uzbekistan and kirghizia.
From a storyteller’s perspective, i might crudely reduce this di-
lemma of an all-but-stalled Eu reform and accession process to that 
of a “non-narrative” competing with emergent “anti-narratives.” The 
result is incoherence. i will come back to this matter of the European 
union, and why i believe that any sincere effort to rescue the club 
from the centrifugal forces tearing it apart should be informed by a 
thorough discussion of human cognition and the importance of nar-
ratives. But first I need to explain the narrative of the Daily News, a 
47-year-old English language newspaper in Turkey. For this is really 
the experience that has been driving my thoughts on the dnA of 
narratives.
After more than two decades working in the u.s. media, i swore 
off the profession in 2000. An academic project brought me back 
to Turkey in 2001, a country where i lived as a teenager and young 
adult. in 2004, the fates brought me back to journalism, initially to 
edit referans, Turkey’s national business daily, part of the dogan 
media group. Among the newspapers, magazines and television net-
work owned by the sprawling dogan is also the country’s English 
language daily. i run what is surely the smallest division in a sprawl-
ing company. As one might imagine, the logic of keeping the com-
pany’s lone American at a Turkish language newspaper when the 
English newpaper was suffering began to feel the strain. After more 
than a year’s resistance, I finally moved back to work in my native 
language in 2006. As an experience within a complex and multi-fac-
eted organization, the experience has bolstered my respect for hans-
dietrich genscher. it has also, however, diminished my esteem for 
the institutions of the Eu. 
What really convinced me to do it were the results of an infor-
mal but months-long discussion among several leading minds in the 
company. These included Eyüp Can, the editor-in-chief of referans, 
sedat Ergin, the editor-in-chief of millyet, a host of thinkers outside 
the company and Vuslat Dogan Sabancı, my boss and the publisher 
of Hürriyet, the company’s flagship. Our fundamental conclusion 
was that there are really just five “narratives” about Turkey in play in 
the European media. They are as follows:
• The Turkish-Kurdish ethnic conflict.
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• The issue of “Armenian genocide,” alleged if you ask Turks, a his-
torical fact if you ask Armenians.
• so-called “honor” killings, the practice of murdering female fam-
ily members who betray the familial trust with such “crimes” as an 
inappropriate love affair. The standard narrative generally makes 
this a “kurdish” problem. 
• Freedom of expression, particularly the notorious “Article 301” 
of the penal code that used to make insulting “Turkishness” a 
crime, now downgraded to an offense only when one insults the 
“Turkish nation.” it should also be mentioned that this narrative 
really has just three protagonists: novelists orhan Pamuk and Elif 
Şafak and the murdered Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink. 
The hundreds of other journalists involved in 301 cases (including 
those who work for the daily news) don’t exist.
• last is the cultural symbolism of the islam vs. secularism, the 
headscarf issue, the debate on secular fidelity that of late has been 
the most dominant narrative, the leitmotif of so many stories that 
are nominally about other issues.
This really is the scrabble board for the 130 or so accredited for-
eign journalists in İstanbul and the 25 or so in the capital of Ankara. 
sure there are the exceptions that prove this rule. Cyprus. meddle-
some generals. Foreign investment. or the inevitable shopping de-
lights of İstanbul or the bars of Bodrum. But the basic material for 
communicating Turkish reality is limited to the above. Turkey’s Eu 
accession process is rarely a narrative in itself; inevitably it is a de-
rivative blend of the above five-part menu. To offer overly simplistic 
examples: “Turkey should join the Eu once it resolves the kurdish-
Turkish” conflict.” Or no, “Turkey should be outside until it faces up 
to the Armenian genocide.” These would be two convenient ways to 
approach a discussion. While these are not good bar lines to pick up 
girls in İstanbul, they are quite serviceable at any expatriate coffee-
house where a would-be “western journalist” seeks to establish him 
or herself as a “deep thinker.”
in the searCh for a magiC hand
i should emphasize here that i am only using the Turkish case 
as a sort of laboratory to discuss these issues of communication and 
perception. All societies, or at least most, suffer to one degree or 
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another from the paucity of relevant narratives. The poor Czechs 
have only had one spring season, back in 1968. Finland is most often 
referred to in the world’s media not as a country, but as a verb, as 
in Russia’s “finlandization” of Georgia or Iraq’s attempted “finland-
ization” of kuwait some years back. danes will be forever regaling 
guests at dinner parties with the story of how their king pinned the 
star of david on his chest in solidarity with the country’s Jews during 
the nazi occupation. never mind that this particular narrative was 
the figment of novelist Leon Uris’s imagination. Danes really have 
no other transcendent narrative with which to communicate their 
many virtues. if you have any doubt about this latter point, please 
read “smila’s sense of snow” by Peter hoeg (1992 in danish, 1993 in 
English).
Which then brings me to the point i sought to make at the outset, 
that most often, this impoverished package of narratives is all the 
news media has to work with. There are shelves full of books that 
seek to understand why the media so often seem to work in lock-
step. Every journalism school has its resident theorist ready to recite 
noam Choamsky or others claiming to have found the magic hand(s) 
which guide(s) all this. To be honest, i spent many years seeking this 
“magic hand” myself.
And i found it. not in a book on journalism, interestingly enough. 
But rather in “six degrees – The science of a Connected Age” by 
duncan J. Watts. A mathematician by training, Watts’ work is an en-
deavor to explain the formation and operation of networks, such as 
the internet. There are a lot of interesting examples of how circles of 
communication work. For example chirping crickets. “The question 
in my mind was, Who was listening to whom?” Watts asks in explain-
ing his study of cricket sociology. “surely there was no master cricket 
from which all others took their cues. But if not, then how did they 
manage to synchronize so well?”
For the full answer you will have to read the book, which explores 
much more than crickets. But this lesson from biology’s science of 
emergence, of unplanned and random but critical “triggers” being 
the key to network synchronization, sheds more light on the way 
reporters work than anything i have yet encountered. For after all, 
reporters are very social creatures and they exist and operate in very 
tight social networks. Journalists generally hate this caricature. so be 
forewarned that they will only admit to this late at night, after drink-
ing large amounts of alcohol.
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rather than chirp like crickets who harmonize as the sun sets 
over the swamp, we tend to harmonize our chirping with various ex-
ercises in narrative calibration. These occur as we read one another’s 
work, “compete” within the confines of implicitly agreed consensus 
or trade our stories during working hours on the same buses or air-
planes or after hours in the same bars and beds. one of the few help-
ful books to emerge from our craft on this is “Boys on the Bus” by 
Timothy krause. it was written back in the Pleistocene Age of 1972 
but its insights are timeless and universal. The unwritten rule is to be 
careful and not stray too far from the consensus truth.
An excellent example of the way this works in the Turkish con-
text came recently when the foreign press corps in Turkey finally 
approached a complex reality involving the ruling Justice and de-
velopment Party, or AkP. They began to observe that Prime minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has begun to act of late with all the finesse, 
tolerance and democratic spirit of, say, zimbabwe’s robert mugabe 
in his formative years. stories on the AkP, of course, are required 
to be constructed according to the architecture of narrative no. 5 
on the list i shared above. This is always a binary narrative cast-
ing the pious “conservative democrats” from the islamic heartland of 
Anatolia against the near-fascist “kemalists” of the leafy precincts of 
İstanbul and Ankara. 
A good place to further explore narrative no. 5 is the website 
of the European stability initiative, a partially Eu-funded project 
chaired by nobel laureate matti Ahtisaari. This particular narrative, 
sometimes constructed around the phraseology of “Black Turks” vs. 
“White Turks,” actually traces back to seminal work done on center 
vs. periphery dynamics done by the eminent political theorist Şerif 
mardin beginning in the 1960s. it is a useful tool, whose analytical 
value might be comparable to use of the Protestant-Catholic schism 
as an explainer of the dichotomies in Belgian domestic politics. This 
is fine, just so long as the analyst does not overlook the history of 
the netherlands and its relationship to Flanders. Which, if you allow 
me the use of this analogy, is exactly what Ahtisaari’s group does and 
which is why i think he should be asked to return the nobel Peace 
Prize.
But let us return to narrative no. 5 as it is used by journalists. 
While elements of this did indeed inform Turkish journalists in the 
early days of the AkP, most long ago abandoned it as their under-
standing of this dynamic political party became more textured. The 
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foreign media did not. until last november, when they abandoned it 
in near unison. An editorial we ran in the daily news on december 
1, 2008 is useful in understanding this. it ran under the headline 
“gambling in Casablanca? We are shocked!”
“We are all familiar with the means by which pedestrians of Turkish 
cities collectivize their will to brave traffic: a phenomenon of density and 
unspoken social cohesion. Going solo against aggressive motorists is dar-
ing. But if, say, four or five pedestrians step into the crosswalk at the 
same time, this challenge to the oncoming taxi usually works. Sadly, the 
media in all societies tend to work the same way. A trend, a develop-
ment, a shift in political wind may be sensed by the lone newspaper 
or magazine. But seldom do they write until what social psychologists 
call “groupthink” provides confidence. Journalists tend to shuffle together, 
particularly when confronting the traffic of a new narrative.
On groupthink cue, the Economist, the New York Times, Reuters and 
Newsweek have collectively discovered that Turkey’s Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has developed an authoritarian edge. “We are 
shocked,” might be a way to express our reaction, paraphrasing Captain 
Renault’s discovery of gambling in the epic film “Casablanca.” 
For as the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review’s İrem Köker re-
ports in today’s newspaper, these are the same international media orga-
nizations who have long criticized Erdoğan opponents of being “staunch-
ly secular” and resistant to change. They reached different conclusions 
to explain Erdogan’s migration from “reformist to autocrat.” But finally 
they noticed what their Turkish colleagues have been writing for months. 
We wish, of course, that the international media had been vigilant last 
spring when the PM was using the public seizure of an opposition me-
dia group to convert a political crony employing his son-in-law into a 
media baron with the aid of $800 million or so in questionably secured 
state funding. We were disappointed with many of our international 
colleagues’ silence when the PM called on followers to boycott this news-
paper and others in the Doğan Media Group for reporting a German 
corruption prosecution – and conviction – of Erdoğan allies. 
When the prime minister launched his new “love or leave it” rhetoric of 
intolerance at a speech in Hakkari some weeks back, we expected more 
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international notice. And the stripping of seven reporters accredited to 
the prime ministry of their press cards a few weeks ago was a tactic that 
should have received far more international condemnation than it did. A 
Turkish phrase comes to mind: “işte buyurun.” 
Knowing our prime minister as we do, we expect the next move of his 
defenders will be to decry “conspiracy” and concoct nutty theories about 
the synchronized nature of the new criticism. This should be ignored. 
For “groupthink” is a curse of lazy journalists everywhere. More impor-
tant, we believe, is that the “group” finally summoned the courage to step 
off of the curb.”
To summarize: a paucity of narratives, and the intellectual erosion 
of narratives, lead to poor journalism. This in turn leads to a kind of 
counter-evolutionary cognition on the part of the news-consuming 
public. The virus, surely, spreads to public officialdom, a sort of self-
reinforcing feedback loop of ignorance takes hold. democracy be-
comes something less than that; civil society becomes less civil and 
often downright dumb. 
the seCret of diversity of perspeCtives
Welcome circa 2009 to most discussions on the future of the 
European union. But wait! i should also emphasize here that i am 
not making the case for propaganda. When the odd Turkish official 
or public relations executive has had the patience to listen to the 
case i have just argued, they tend to nod in agreement before every 
point. Then comes the “ah hah!” remark and i watch and listen as 
my reasoning is transformed into a case for telling Turkey’s “real 
story.” There needs to be more advertising on Cnn or more “stu-
dent ambassadors” visiting young people’s club in Europe or more 
meetings with editorial boards in london or lyon. maybe a website 
or two. The dutch Europarliamentarian Joost lagendijk has even 
gone so far as to suggest the solution to this might be handing out 
brochures to visiting European tourists on Turkey’s mediterranean 
coast.
And here we part company. For this is about the game of scrabble. 
not the game of Charades.
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The five narratives I mention above are all very real. Often they 
are treated in a shallow fashion. They also reveal only a narrow slice 
of Turkish reality. in the Turkish context and others, the operating 
narratives do not need to be “countered” as first reflexes often com-
mand. They need to be deepened and expanded upon.
As i have tried to argue throughout, this is the European Prob-
lem: the Eu has no narrative(s). so where does one go from here? 
The volume for which this chapter is written, i am told, is supposed 
to help us move toward solutions. As i confessed, i am not about 
to offer bold insight. i have no paradigms to shift. not only am i no 
expert on Europe and its union, i am not even European although 
if it helps, my grandmother was Alsatian. she liked stories, so let me 
conclude with one on this unresolved matter of narratives, the mys-
terious tectonic plates that, however unseen, define the fault lines of 
human communication. 
Every september i have the privilege of attending a one-week 
gathering on the coast of California, near where i was born and grew 
up, at a venerable research center and think tank called the Esalen 
institute. my ticket into this venerable institute (worth googling if 
you have not heard of it) is an ongoing program called the global 
Potentials Program. it actually grew from an initiative years ago 
that brought then little-known Boris Yeltsin to his first visit to the 
united states. many argue yeltsin’s epiphany at Esalen changed 
the world. Today the working group of gPP is 25 or so very smart 
people (plus me) who have an ongoing conversation about the state 
of the planet. i have learned many things there but my own more 
modest epiphany came at the last gathering. i found myself trudg-
ing to breakfast at 7.30 in the morning with Alok srivastava, an miT 
biochemist. Alok, you will be happy to know, is leading a team of 
cancer researchers who are about to make biopsies, mri scans and 
colonoscopies obsolete. Colonoscopies were not his topic at that 
hour, however. 
No, Alok was trying to finish a point he had begun to make the 
evening before about the influence of Sir Francis Bacon (or the lack 
of it) on such indian writers as Arundhati roy and Jhumpa lahiri. 
in turn, i was mumbling something about the daily news, our many 
challenges and the sheer density of the perspective diversity that de-
fines our remarkable newsroom. “Of course,” Alok responded, typi-
cally with a question. “How else could you fire the imagination in the 
narrative battle space of our age?” 
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That line stopped me in my tracks. i had to borrow Alok’s pen 
to write that line down on a napkin i found in my pocket. For me, 
Alok posed the question of our age. For me the answer is perspective 
diversity. in response to the dilemma i posed above, we have cre-
ated a newspaper whose team’s native languages include four Ara-
bic speakers, three kurdish speakers, two ladino speakers, two Ar-
menian speakers, one Farsi speaker, one georgian speaker and one 
greek speaker. And that is just among the “Turks” at a newspaper 
in a country which – as seen from Europe – only has two ethnic 
groups. Among the international staff, we have one new zealander, 
two Australians, a Finn, a greek, a german, three American citizens, 
an indian, an iranian and a Pole. 
i recently discovered, looking through Cv’s, that if the publishers 
decide next week to switch the newspaper’s language of publication 
from English to French, about two thirds of the staff are already pre-
pared. There’s a serious marxist cabal, perhaps a third of the staff 
fasts during ramadan; we have all three branches of monotheism 
covered plus one zoroastrian and until recently, the sports editor 
was into rastafarianism. The dreadlocks disappeared about two 
weeks ago and i have not yet established why. We all disagree on 
many issues, in lifestyles in modes of thought. But we do have a com-
mon narrative. in this essay, i hope it has emerged. if not, i am sure 
the archeologists of the 31st Century will understand.
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What does the eu 
need to do and What 
are Its Fears?
ADAM SzYMAńSKI
There are a lot of obstacles on the Turkish way to the Eu. Tur-key itself must overcome most of them. European politicians such as Eu Enlargement Commissioner olli rehn repeat as a 
sort of mantra that this country must speed up the reform process 
slowed down after the beginning of the accession negotiations in 
october 2005.1 Turkey must first of all improve the fulfillment of 
the political Copenhagen criteria. it still does not guarantee minority 
rights (kurds, religious minorities), freedom of speech or rights of 
women. it is too hard to control the army and too easy to ban po-
litical parties. The political developments in 2008 (the application to 
the Constitutional Court to close down the AkP and the Ergenekon 
case) also show old problems about respect for such democratic rules 
as the rule of law or the separation of powers.2 in order to avoid even 
more serious internal instability (connected with tensions between 
the secular establishment and the religious-conservative groups) and 
consolidate its democratic order, Turkey has not only to adopt the 
new “civil” constitution or implement the “road map” for the period 
of 2007-2013 and the national Program for the Adoption of Eu Ac-
quis, but also to solve the systemic problems. They go beyond the 
question of the model of state and society and have a lot to do with 
the pillars of the republic connected with the kemalist ideology. 
1 Cf. o. rehn, Şimdi AB zamanı, “milliyet”, 25.08.08, www.milliyet.com.
tr/2008/08/28
2 Cf. G. Tahincioğlu, AKP’ye ağır suçlamalar, “milliyet”, 16.03.2008, www.
milliyet.com.tr/2008/03/16/siyaset; E. Ezber, E. Alus, m. A. Erdem, 
Komutanlar çekyatta sabahladı, “milliyet”, 03.07.2008, www.milliyet.com.
tr/2008/07/03/siyaset/?ver=86
26
When it comes to Turkish obligations concerning its foreign policy, 
the Cyprus issue, as well as disputes with greece and Armenia, re-
mains unsolved.3
There clearly are, however, obstacles on the European union side 
too. The policy of the Eu and the member states happens to affect the 
Turkish pre-accession process negatively. This policy is quite often a 
result of Europe’s problems that come to light when the Turkish case 
comes up. Actually, each of the previous rounds of Eu enlargement 
“has been a stimulus to reflect on the nature of the EU’s identity, 
to reinvent what it does, how it sees itself.”4 The 2004 enlargement 
already showed the union’s problems, among others the adjustment 
difficulties of the “old” member states.  
in many cases European actions only aggravate the above-men-
tioned internal Turkish problems. it must be underlined that there 
is a vicious circle concerning the relations between the prospects of 
Turkish Eu membership and internal changes in that country. Tur-
key needs more political and economic reforms in order to gain the 
ultimate goal, i.e. membership of the Eu. The prospect of Turkish 
accession is, on the other hand, an indispensable incentive to carry 
out such reforms. When the Eu gives signals that it is not certain 
about Turkish membership then Turkey loses the factor that mobi-
lizes elites and society to continue with changes in their country. 
This article is an analysis of these “European” obstacles on the 
Turkish way to the Eu. Three dimensions of problems are taken into 
consideration, i.e. formal-normative, political, and socio-psychologi-
cal. it is argued that although all of them are important, the key issue 
is to solve the problems in the third dimension concerning above all 
the negative attitude of European public opinion towards Turkish Eu 
membership and fears connected with it. The author proposes some 
3 All these problems are mentioned in the latest Eu reports (European 
Commission and European Parliament), for more, see: Commission Staff 
Working Document. Turkey 2007 Progress Report, Brussels, 6.11.2007, http://
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_pro-
gress_reports_en.pdf; European Parliament resolution of 21 May 2008 
on Turkey‘s 2007 progress report (2007/2269(ini)), Wednesday, 21 may 
2008 – strasbourg,www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getdoc.do?pubref=-//
EP//TExT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0224+0+doC+xml+v0//En&language=En
4 k. dyson, Reinventing Europe? Turkey, European Union Accession and Europea-
nization, in: E. lagro, k. E. Jørgensen (ed.), Turkey and the European Uni-
on. Prospects for a Difficult Encounter, Palgrave macmillan, Basingtoke, new 
york 2007, p.51.
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solutions that must be treated as illustrations only. Their effective 
implementation is not easy, but possible.
the formal-normative dimension
The first group of problems on the EU side concerns the formal 
and normative issues. There are still problems with defining the fi-
nalité politique of the union. European politicians are not sure if this 
should be federation or intergovernmental organization and whether 
it will be characterized by more “differential integration”. They do not 
know if it should be more internally or externally oriented, playing 
the role of a global actor on the international scene. Finally, although 
there are some principles included in the treaties on which the Eu 
is based, Europeans still think about values that can be components 
of the European identity of the union. depending on their political 
profile politicians in Europe treat the cultural (Christian democrats) 
or political (social democrats) issue as a core element of this identity.5 
The lack of answers to these questions stops progress on the Turkish 
way to the Eu. These dilemmas have a lot to do with the different 
interests of member states or the political profile of their leading par-
ties. it is not realistic then to force European politicians to make the 
final decision in a short time. However, it is possible to start a matter-
of-fact public debate on the above-mentioned dilemmas. 
The “committee of wise men” can initiate it. such councils of 
experts have often been able to provide ideas about the process of 
European integration. The committee “would find it possible to do 
things which are simply out of the question in the narrower political 
decision-making sphere.”6 They would focus on strategic questions, 
e.g. how the EU can preserve its significance in the global context, 
to avoid getting bogged down in details. however, the public debate 
initiated by the committee cannot be like the discussion about the 
future of the Eu, raising a lot of questions and actually not answer-
ing the core ones. Within this debate all the arguments “for” and 
5 See more: A. Szymański, Turcja a tożsamość europejska – konfrontacja dwóch 
wizji Europy (Turkey and European identity – Confrontation of Two vi-
sions of Europe), in: F. Gołembski (ed.), Tożsamość europejska (European 
identity), Wyd. instytutu nauk Politycznych uniwersytetu Warszawskie-
go, Warszawa 2005, pp. 128-169.
6 m. Chardon, d. hierlemann, s. seeger, A Chance for Wise Man, “spotlight 
Europe”, october 2007, Center for Applied Policy research (CAP), mu-
nich 2007, p. 6.
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“against” a specific solution should be thoroughly analyzed. On the 
other hand the EU can also be forced by reality to define the ultimate 
goals (the problem of finalité politique), especially that concerning its 
role in the world.7
The second issue concerns the old dichotomy of widening vs. 
deepening. The negative result of the referendum on the lisbon 
Treaty strengthened the argument about the need for Eu reform be-
fore the next enlargement rounds and the debate between countries 
supporting the widening of the Eu and those that treat deepening 
as a priority.8 of course, it is beyond question that the union needs 
to be reformed. however, it should not be a tool in the discussion 
about Eu enlargement and the accession of such candidate countries 
as Turkey. The admission of new member states is possible, although 
more difficult without a new treaty. Besides, the Constitutional Trea-
ty and the lisbon Treaty are about many things, but not necessarily 
about Eu enlargement, as many citizens think. it is certainly not the 
main issue in the substance of the Treaties.
it is not, however, very probable that countries skeptical about 
Eu enlargement would be convinced by opponents. There is a need, 
then, to recognize the reality and find a reasonable solution based on 
compromise between the two groups of countries. one example is 
the introduction of a system in the Eu that provides for the sequence 
enlargement-reform.9 however, the point is that it can discourage 
supporters of enlargement from continuing their policy towards 
such candidate countries as Turkey.
The third formal-normative issue concerns the enlargement 
strategy of the Eu.10 The current new strategy potentially creates 
7 Cf. E. F. Keyman, z. Öniş, Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global 
Dynamics and Domestic Transformations, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi 
Yayınları, İstanbul 2007, pp. 48-51; A. Szymański, Turcja a tożsamość 
europejska – konfrontacja dwóch wizji Europy (Turkey and European 
identity – Confrontation of Two visions of Europe), pp. 128-169.
8 it was broadly commented, also in the Polish press. see e.g.: Tusk kry-
tykuje Sarkozy’ego i Merkel (Tusk criticizes sarkozy and merkel), “gaze-
ta Wyborcza”, 20.06.2008, http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomos-
ci/1,80708,5335408.html
9 Cf. k-o. lang, d. schwarzer, Die Diskussion über die Aufnahmefähigkeit der 
EU, sWP-studie 31, Berlin, dezember 2007, www.swp-berlin.org/com-
mon/get_document.php?asset_id=4558
10 For more see: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council. EU Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007 (in-
cluding annexed special report on the EU‘s capacity to integrate new members), 
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some problems for the Turkish case. it concerns its two main prin-
ciples, i.e. conditionality and Eu absorption or, rather, integration 
capacity. Eu accession conditionality is not effective any more. 
There are two main conditions that must be fulfilled to make this 
principle work: the presence of the Eu membership incentive and 
relatively low costs of internal adoption of the Eu rules.11 The first 
issue concerns the union’s approach. At present it is noticeable that 
the prospect of Turkish Eu membership is rather unclear. some 
member states emphasize the open-ended nature of negotiations 
and start talking about alternative concepts.12 Because of this Tur-
key loses the factor that mobilizes elites and society to continue 
with the necessary changes in the country. moreover, conditional-
ity does not help solve many dilemmas on the Turkish way to the 
Eu. it is silent about many political problems (e.g. 10% threshold), 
ineffective when it comes to implementation, and not adjusted to 
the political reality in Turkey, which is characterized by internal 
balances between many groups in society. The other problem is 
the strengthening of the political character of this principle (more 
on this below).13 This shows clearly that conditionality must be 
modified. It is important first of all to strengthen its holistic ap-
proach in order to take into consideration the all-important issues, 
including the implementation of reforms. The political nature of 
the problems appearing within conditionality should be translated 
into firm rules, conditions and benchmarks that will help to define 
and understand the content of the conditions more clearly.14 it will 
be more difficult to restore the clear prospect of Turkish accession. 
Brussels, 8.11.2006, Com (2006) 649, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/com_649_strategy_paper_en.pdf
11 Cf. F. schimmelfennig, s. Engert, h. knobel, Costs, Commitment and Com-
pliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and 
Turkey, “Journal of Common market studies”, vol. 41, no. 3, 2003, pp. 
499-501.
12 See more: A. Szymański, Alternatives to EU Membership. The Case of 
Turkey, “The Polish Quarterly of international Affairs”, 2007, no. 4, pp. 
55-72. 
13 Cf. n. Tocci, Report, Unpacking European Discourses: Conditionality, Impact and 
Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations, in: n. Tocci (ed.), Conditionality, Impact and 
Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations, iAi-TEPAv report, July 2007, www.iai.it/
pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_9.pdf, pp.9-15.
14 Cf. M. Aydın, A. T. Esen, Conditionality, Impact and Prejudices: A 
Concluding View from Turkey, in: n. Tocci (ed.), Conditionality, Impact 
and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations, op.cit., p. 132.
30
This is a task for Eu members that are for Eu membership for Tur-
key. They should counterbalance the position of skeptics, underlin-
ing that Turkey can be an EU member in the future (if it fulfills the 
Copenhagen criteria) and that the Eu states have some obligations 
since they agreed on the candidate status of Turkey.
The capacity of the Eu to absorb new member states has to be 
modified as well. It still lacks clear meaning. It leads to a situa-
tion that is misused by those European politicians who are against 
Turkish accession. deconstruction of this principle is consequently 
needed. it means that some of the more objective and precise phe-
nomena of the EU integration capacity must be defined. Until now 
it only concerns the proper functioning of Eu institutions, budget 
and policies. A group of CEPs analysts propose in addition to this: 
the capacity of the Eu goods and service markets, labor market and 
society to absorb new member states, as well as the union’s capacity 
to assure its strategic security.15 An iAi-TEPAv report proposes “to 
undertake an in-depth analysis of Turkey’s impact on the union, its 
institutions, its budget and its individual member states responding 
to the concerns (…).”16 The impact studies, i.e. documents assessing 
the impact of the accession of one country on particular Eu poli-
cies that are now prepared by the European Commission are going 
in the right direction in this context.17 it is, moreover, important to 
have a dynamic approach by means of a detailed definition of the 
Eu integration capacity. it means that it is not reasonable to discuss 
the question of today’s integration capacity, because the accession of 
new member states would take place in the long perspective. in the 
meantime many factors change.18 This concerns first of all Turkey, 
which could be an Eu member by 2015 at the earliest.
15 Cf. M. Emerson, S. Aydın, J. de Clerck-Sachsse, G. Noutcheva, Just what 
is this ‘absorption capacity’ of the European Union?, CEPs Policy Brief, no. 113, 
september 2006, http://shop.ceps.be/Bookdetail.php?item_id=1381, pp. 
9-10.
16 Cf. M. Aydın, A. T. Esen, Conditionality, Impact and Prejudices, op.cit., p. 134.
17 in the case of Turkey the Commission has prepared a report on energy 
supplies. Cf. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2007-2008, Brussels 
6.11.2007, COM (2007) 663 final, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/
key_documents/2007/nov/strategy_paper_en.pdf, p.12.
18 Cf. M. Emerson, S. Aydın, J. de Clerck-Sachsse, G. Noutcheva, Just what 
is this ‘absorption capacity’ of the European Union?, op.cit., p. 11.
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the politiCal dimension
The second group of obstacles from the European side on the 
Turkish way to the Eu are of political nature. Politicians from some 
member states skeptical about Turkish Eu accession (France and 
Austria among others) have misused the Turkish case to achieve po-
litical goals going far beyond blocking the entry of this state. it is 
noticeable both in the case of the pre-accession process and acces-
sion negotiations and that of the national or European Parliament 
elections. 
The principles and rules of the Eu enlargement strategy and the 
negotiating Framework for Turkey are being misused.19 This con-
cerns the conditionality analyzed above and the Eu’s integration 
capacity, which have consequently become politicized. About the 
first case Nathalie Tocci wrote as follows: “the interests and views of 
several member states have led to internal Eu pushes to ‘condition’ 
Turkey’s accession process to obligations relating to Armenia, the 
Aegean and Cyprus.”20 The preparation of the report of the European 
Parliament on Turkish progress on the way to the Eu in 2006 (Camiel 
Eurlings report) shows this phenomenon best. during work on the 
final version of the report in the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Bel-
gian deputy veronique de keyser wanted to introduce a clause that 
would state that recognition by Turkey of the Armenian massacre as 
a genocide is a requirement for becoming an Eu member. giorgos 
dimitrakopoulos – a deputy from greece – insisted on mentioning 
the obligation of Turkey to recognize the genocide not only of Arme-
nians, but also Pontic greeks.21 some Eu states focus selectively on 
internal Turkish problems. They emphasize the problem of article 
301 of the penal code and the need for protection of the rights of 
women and religious minorities, but forget to talk about economic 
problems or rights of muslim minorities.22 The principle of condi-
tionality is also misused in the case of the negotiating Framework 
for Turkey. France, for instance, is using the mechanism of benchmarks 
19 see more: Negotiating Framework for Turkey, www.europa.eu.int/comm/en-
largement/docs/pdf/st20002_en05_ Tr _framedoc.pdf
20 n. Tocci, Report, Unpacking European Discourses, op.cit., p. 14.
21 Cf. Amendments 1-343. Draft Report Camiel Eurlings, Turkey’s Progress towards 
accession (2006/2118(INI)), 4.7.2006, http://jmp.iku.edu.tr/European%20
Parliament-Ammendments%20on%20draft%20report%20on%20Turkey-
July%202006.pdf, pp. 28 and 48.
22 Cf. n. Tocci, Report, Unpacking European Discourses, op.cit., p. 14.
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– requirements for opening and closure of negotiation chapters – to 
block the opening of some chapters and progress on the Turkish way 
to the Eu. For instance, it proposed to set as a condition for closing 
the chapter “Science and Research” the introduction of the fulfill-
ment of the Copenhagen criteria into the Eu’s negotiating position. 
Then France had objections concerning economic and monetary pol-
icy and this chapter has provisionally not been closed.23
There is the same problem concerning the Eu absorption/inte-
gration capacity. The Eu member states skeptical about Turkish ac-
cession treat it as an absolute priority and do not take into consid-
eration the other side of the coin underlined in the Eu enlargement 
strategy, i.e. the geopolitical significance of the process. One effect 
of the policy of their representatives is for instance the report on Eu 
enlargement (Elmar Brok report) adopted by the European Parlia-
ment in 2008. integration capacity is present in almost every para-
graph of the text.24 it is a useful tool that helps European politicians 
block the accession process of Turkey and other candidate countries. 
The principle of integration capacity is used “to erect seemingly ‘ob-
jective’ barriers to integration, primarily with Turkey”25, instead of 
facing challenges connected with internal political problems in Eu 
countries that the Turkish case raises among electorates. “in other 
words, instead of paving the way for an informed, rational debate by 
providing facts and balanced arguments on Turkey’s accession, most 
of the Eu leaders have so far played into the misinformed public 
fears of Turkey’s membership.”26
This opinion points out the essential problem of the policy of some 
Eu member states towards Turkish accession. it is noticeable that the 
internal situation in countries like France, Austria or Germany influ-
ences the attitude of their governments to this issue. They formulate 
and conduct policy towards the Eu membership of Turkey with an eye 
to their own socio-economic problems. They have used such issues 
as the problem of building a multicultural society and integration of 
23 Cf. h. de Breson, P. ridet, Bruxelles attend les choix de M. Sarkozy sur la Tur-
quie, “le monde”, 24.05.2007.
24 see more: European Parliament resolution of 10 July 2008 on the Com-
mission’s 2007 enlargement strategy paper, 10 July 2008, www.eu-
roparl.europa.eu
25 S. A. Düzgit, H. Altınay, S. Benhabib, C. Özdemir, J-F. Leguil-Bayart, See-
king Kant in the EU’s Relations with Turkey, TESEV, İstanbul, December 2006, 
p. 13.
26 ibid., p. 13.
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minorities, criminality and unemployment, to create islamophobia or 
xenophobia within their own societies (see more below).27 it is very 
difficult to force European political elites to “disentangle the question 
of Turkey’s accession from the fear of muslim immigration”28 which is 
recommended by some analysts and scholars.
These phobias are exploited by politicians when Eu membership 
for Turkey is at issue. This is very clear, especially when it comes to 
elections. in the presidential election campaign in France in April-
may 2007 the Turkish issue was one of the main election topics. it 
was used first of all by Nicolas Sarkozy to gain support from the 
French electorate, with its negative attitude towards muslim immi-
grants.29 immigration fears and their impact on the labor market were 
the main issues forming the negative attitude to Eu membership in 
the parliamentary election campaign in Austria in september 2008. 
The Austrian People’s Party (ÖvP), one of the two main parties in 
this country, linked the negative attitude to Eu membership for Tur-
key to the problem of safe borders and limiting migration of workers. 
The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) was more radical. it played on the 
xenophobic feelings of citizens in its election manifesto, underlining 
that there were too many foreigners in Austria and then that Turkey 
was an alien body to Europe.30
What can be done in this situation? First, the “sizable and vocal 
pro-Turkey coalition in Europe”31 consisting of such Eu countries as 
the united kingdom, sweden or Poland should counteract the use of 
the Turkish case by some other member states. Actions against the 
27 Cf. g. Austin, k. Parker, The Mono-cultural Delusion: Turkey and Migration 
Politics, in: s. Twigg, s. schaefer, g. Austin, k. Parker, Turks in Europe: 
Why are we afraid?, The Foreign Policy Centre, london, september 2005, 
pp.28-42.
28 Cf. A. r. Jimenez, Tackling Turkey‘s Image Problem in the European Union, Po-
licy Watch #1367, The Washington institute for near East Policy, 30 April 
2008, www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?Cid=2820
29 Cf. A. szeptycki, Problematyka międzynarodowa w kampanii wyborczej we 
Francji (International issues in the Election Campaign in France), “Polski 
Przegląd Dyplomatyczny” (Polish Diplomatic Review), 2007, no. 3, pp. 
56-60.
30 Cf. Neustart für Österreich, www.oevp.at/Common/downloads/Wahlpro-
gramm_innen_Ansicht.pdf, p. 22; Österreich im Wort, www.fpoe.at/filead-
min/Contentpool/Portal/wahl08/FP_-Wahlprogramm_nrW08.pdf
31 z. Öniş, Turkey’s encounters with the new Europe: multiple transformations, inhe-
rent dilemmas and the challenges ahead, “Journal of southern Europe and the 
Balkans” 2006, no. 3, p. 297.
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last French initiatives show that it is possible. The above-mentioned 
committee of wise men will not be working on the issues of Turkish 
accession or the borders of Europe (at least it should not do so). The 
mediterranean union was in the end replaced by the concept of a 
union for the mediterranean, which should give new life to the Bar-
celona Process.32 France was also not successful in deleting the word 
“accession” from official documents concerning Turkey (e.g. the com-
mon position of the Association Council).33 The pro-Turkey forces 
should also be more active in the political debate on Turkey at the 
European level. They can introduce to the discussion more balanced 
arguments on Turkish accession based on pure facts, instead of pre-
senting poorly justified, exaggerated opinions for which counter-ar-
guments can be easily found (like in the case of the “bridge role”).34
It is very difficult to give any recommendations regarding the use 
of internal social and economic problems to oppose Turkish aspi-
rations, because here it is all about changes in the economic and 
social policy of Eu countries. it is easy to underline the importance 
of more interest in Eu countries in demographic change, but it is 
difficult to implement this kind of policy.35  however, something can 
be done e.g. in the case of the migration problem. The European 
governments should pay more attention to the “ideology of migra-
tion”. They should promote more the virtues of migration like it has 
been done in the usA, Canada or Australia. more attention to this 
ideology should mean posing the question of whether migration is 
good or bad and what should be the principles of a country’s integra-
tion policy. normalization of cultural diversity should also take place 
within the European ideology of migration.36 it is connected with 
the need for the Eu to promote the concept of citizenship based on 
multiple identity.
32 see more: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, Com (2008) 319 
(Final), Brussels 20/05/08, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euro-
med/com08_319_en.pdf
33 Cf. s. kohen, Yeni AB belgesi ile yola devam, “milliyet”, 28.05.2008, www.mil-
liyet.com.tr/default.aspx?aType=yazardetay&Articleid=760052&Au-
thorid=58&date=28.05.2008 
34 see more: A. giannakopoulos, k. maras, Der Europäische Türkei-
Diskurs: Eine Vergleichsanalyse, in:  A. giannakopoulos, k. maras 
(hrsg.), Die Türkei-Debatte in Europa. Ein Vergleich, vs verlag für 
sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2005, pp. 218-224.
35 Cf. Cf. Austin, k. Parker, The Mono-cultural Delusion, op.cit., p. 44.
36 ibid., pp.35-37 and 44-45.
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the soCio-psyChologiCal dimension
The third, socio-psychological factor, connected with other di-
mensions, seems to be the most important obstacle to be overcome. 
The key issue here is the negative attitude of the public opinion of 
many Eu countries towards Turkish accession, based very often on 
prejudices and stereotypes. results of Eurobarometer survey 66 done 
in september-october 2006 show that 87% of Austrians, 78% of ger-
mans and 77% of luxembourg citizens are against Turkish accession. 
According to FT/harris of June 2007 big majorities of French (71%) 
and german (66%) adults said no to Eu membership for Turkey.37 it 
is a huge problem, because Eu citizens have more and more to say 
on the continuation of EU enlargement. A direct influence on that 
process is possible, due to the principle of communication included 
in the new enlargement strategy. it says that European citizens must 
be informed and consulted about Eu enlargement policy.38 There will 
also be referenda, especially on Eu membership for Turkey in some 
countries (e.g. France, Austria). European public opinion also has 
an impact on the prospects of Eu membership for Turkey and other 
countries by influencing the decision of politicians, also regarding 
the future of the Eu. it is important to remember that public opinion 
is a potential electorate and its point of view is taken into consider-
ation to gain support. That is why this socio-psychological factor is 
so important.
The question is why so many European citizens do not want Tur-
key in the Eu. There are many reasons for this phenomenon, but the 
main one lies in their heads. generally speaking European citizens 
have an oversimplified view of Turkey, one that, additionally, is based 
on stereotypes and prejudices. It is one shaped first of all (if not ex-
clusively) by different media that show only a part of the picture. An 
example is the Polish Tv and press. on television, like in Western 
channels, “Turkey means minarets, headscarves and the Bosphorus 
Bridge.”39 People treat Turkey as a typical muslim country, because 
37 data: Standard Eurobarometer 66, Autumn 2006, http://ec.europa.eu/pub-
lic_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf, p. 401; Many European Adults 
Believe that the European Union Should Not Take in New Members, The harris 
Poll® #59, June 20, 2007, www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.
asp?Pid=775
38 Cf. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil. EU Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007, op.cit.
39 katinka Barysch here quotes Paul Taylor, reuter’s European affairs edi-
tor: k. Barysch, What Europeans Think About Turkey and Why?, Briefing Note, 
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they do not see e.g. Atatürk’s mausoleum or things proving that Tur-
key is a secular state. That is why they often do not see any difference 
between Turks and Arabs. “The otherness” of Turkey is emphasized 
in media reports by showing oriental, “Eastern” aspects of the coun-
try that can hardly be seen in Europe. media very rarely show e.g. 
the modern parts of Turkish cities. People in Europe see differences, 
not similarities, then and start thinking of Turkey as a country that 
does not belong to Europe. moreover, Polish press articles on this 
country are dominated by negative issues such as terrorist activities, 
political assassinations, army interventions or human rights abuses. 
Because of all this Polish citizens have the impression that Turkey is 
some kind of islamic religious state and a military dictatorship at the 
same time. It is influenced by the phenomenon that in the European 
education system values prevail over interests in the assessment of 
a country.
The image of Turkey, full of prejudices and stereotypes, is of 
course also created by the above-mentioned European politicians 
from such countries as Austria, germany or France who misuse the 
Turkish case for their political benefit. Because of their policy people 
believe that Turkish accession would certainly mean unemployment 
because of the migration of millions of Turks, too much public mon-
ey going on the Eu budget, the end of the Eu (which would be no 
more than a free trade area) or an Eu with Turkish-dominated institu-
tions, the end of European identity and culture, the islamization of 
Europe, the development of an islamic fundamentalism associated 
solely with terrorism and an unstable neighborhood.40 European 
citizens are convinced by politicians who are against Eu member-
ship for Turkey, because their arguments concern immediate and 
personal issues: loss of jobs, security or threats to national culture. 
The pro-Turkey camp presents benefits that are “strategic, long term 
and rather abstract: economic growth, a stronger Eu foreign policy, 
energy security.”41
The most important thing that must be done to change this situa-
tion is to prepare and implement a new communication and informa-
tion strategy for the Eu countries – both old and new ones, “pros” 
Centre for European reform, september 2007, www.cer.org.uk/pdf/
essay_turkey_barysch_25sept07.pdf, p. 1.
40 see more: C. Aktar, Cliches Against Turkey’s EU Membership, “zeitschrift für 
Türkeistudien”, 1+2(2003), pp. 259-266.
41 k. Barysch, What Europeans Think About Turkey…, op.cit., p. 2.
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and “cons”. It is first of all a task for Turkey, but it needs coopera-
tion with Europeans, on the one hand ngos (including think tanks), 
media and academicians – supported by governments that are often 
under pressure from civil society, and on the other hand – the Eu-
ropean Commission. The Commission can actually be co-designer 
of the project. The main principle of this new strategy should be 
diversification. It means, firstly, that it must be tailored to each EU 
country individually and secondly, that it should provide for differ-
ent means and actions for elites and for ordinary citizens. When it 
comes to the first issue, each EU country actually needs a different 
strategy to be convinced about Turkey. This is because of the differ-
ent interests as well as perceptions of Turkey and Europe itself in 
these states. different approaches are needed in the case of coun-
tries for which the Turkish issue is part of the debate on national 
identity politics (e.g. France, germany, Austria, denmark) and for 
Eu states whose debate on this problem has little or nothing to do 
with Turkey (e.g. the united kingdom, spain, italy, Finland, sweden, 
Poland or slovenia). different arguments must be used in the case of 
countries that have close contact with Turkey or Turkish issues due 
to geographical proximity (e.g. greece), existence of big Turkish or 
other muslim immigrant communities (e.g. germany) as well as mi-
norities influencing the debate on Turkey (e.g. Armenians in France) 
or developed socio-economic relations (e.g. germany or the united 
kingdom) and countries that have less to do with Turkey (e.g. Poland 
or Finland). The same differentiated approach must be applied in 
Eu countries that see the union through the lens of domestic policy 
(e.g. germany or France) or foreign and security affairs (e.g. united 
kingdom or Poland).42 
Both European elites and ordinary citizens need more general in-
formation about Turkey. it is necessary to enable them to develop 
their knowledge of this country and to see the full picture of Turkey. 
First of all they have to find out that this country is not black and 
white and that all of its aspects are very complex. There is no one 
Turkey (the western and eastern parts are completely different) or 
one Turkish Islam or nationalism each of which has its own specific 
character anyway. There are many divisions in Turkish society that 
are complex as well. in this context talking nowadays about the con-
frontation between Islamic and secular circles is also a simplification 
(although sometimes unavoidable). Turkish identity has different di-
42 Cf. n. Tocci, Report, Unpacking European Discourses, op.cit., pp. 25-28.
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mensions as well. it has its Western and Eastern aspect, which is 
hard for Europeans to understand.43 
Apart from general knowledge about Turkey, the new communi-
cation and information strategy should focus on different Eu-related 
issues and introduce them into the European debate about Turkey. 
First, it must present not only difficulties on the Turkish way to the 
Eu, but also the advantages of Turkey as a union member (but with-
out the populist slogans) – first of all in areas of the economy, se-
curity or foreign policy. it should explain to European citizens that 
although they are long-term and abstract, they do matter for their 
lives. sometimes it requires the explanation of the Eu itself or of 
certain political processes. For instance, it is necessary to present 
such issues as the need for the diversification of supplies of energy 
resources to European countries in order to show the role of Turkey 
as an energy hub.  The positive sides of the whole process of Eu 
enlargement must be underlined as well in order to fight against the 
“enlargement fatigue” that influences the Turkish case. The geopoliti-
cal factor, very important in previous enlargement rounds, starting 
with greece in 1981, must be more visible and certainly not dimmed 
by the previously-mentioned integration capacity of the Eu.   
second, as was repeated many times in different debates, Europe-
ans should be aware of the possible consequences of leaving Turkey 
and other candidate countries outside the Eu. They must have the 
opportunity to compare the alternative scenarios, not just to see the 
impact of accession. Europeans must know more about the negative 
consequences of an Eu enlargement blockade, including the threat 
to the union’s credibility.
Third, it is important to show (also by governments) the real pic-
ture of the last Eu enlargements in 2004 and 2007 and their impact 
on the union as well as on member states. A distorted picture of 
this last round of enlargement has a negative influence, especially 
on Turkish membership prospects. it is necessary to explain to the 
citizens of such countries as Austria especially that the accession of 
the 10+2 countries brought benefits to the Austrian economy. The 
actions of the government of Wolfgang schüssel, which after 2004 
pointed out the export surplus of 1.5 billion Euro and 60,000 new 
jobs, went in the right direction, but they must be continued for a 
long period.44
43 See more: A. Szymański, Turcja a tożsamość europejska…, op.cit., pp.145-161. 
44 Cf. Stenographisches Protokoll. 58. Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Öster-
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There are different tools that can be used to meet the above-men-
tioned objectives. When it comes to general knowledge about Turkey, 
the best way to spread it among the European public is to organize 
cultural events that will be attractive and appeal to people. it can be 
film shows or book fairs (like in Frankfurt last year where Turkey was 
a special guest) that would familiarize Europeans with a real Turkey. 
it can also be music and drama festivals or painting exhibitions that 
would prove that there are many similarities between Turkish and 
European art. not only Turkish, but also European ngos and media 
can play a vital role here. The Turkish side can initiate some events, 
but very often civil society organizations in European countries are 
able to carry them out, because they are on the spot, know the peo-
ple better and can access many different measures. Turkey can also 
be explained by European media, with the help of feature articles 
or TV documentaries. All these should be confidence-building mea-
sures. Europeans must be willing to be convinced and a real picture 
of Turkey can help in that case. it would enable European citizens to 
see that “the others” are at the same time “we”, in some areas at least. 
Trying to learn about other cultures used to be one of the principles 
that determined the actions of Europeans. 
When it comes to European elites, other tools can be effective as 
well. The task for scholars – especially European (Turkish research-
ers have more limited access) – is to work on deep analysis of Turkey-
Eu relations. it is precisely researchers and analysts, following the 
rules of objectivity and scientific rigor, who can prepare studies or re-
alize projects that can shed new light on the arguments presented in 
the European debate on Turkey, e.g. presenting the above-mentioned 
scenarios of an Eu without Turkey. The condition for their effective 
influence is that the research or analyses will include some practical 
recommendations and reach European elites. it can be done e.g. by 
organizing seminars and meetings (by universities or think tanks), 
directed at these elites, which will not just be more conferences on 
Turkey-Eu relations. European media and civil society organizations 
can also help to disseminate the results of studies to the public – by 
using a different idiom and type of text (e.g. summaries). When it 
comes to Turkish and European ngos, they too can try to organize 
some visits to Turkey to show the issues important for Turkey-Eu 
reich, xxii. gesetzgebungsperiode, mittwoch, 5. mai 2004, www.parla-
ment.gv.at/pls/portal/docs/page/Pg/dE/xxii/nrsiTz/nrsiTz_00058/
fname_021013.pdf,  p. 48.
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relations. The European side can invite representatives of Turkish 
elites who will be listened to by the European public, e.g. famous 
artists, sportsmen or scholars. There are such initiatives, but more 
has to be done.
ConClUsions
The European union and its member states have a lot of work to 
do to eliminate hurdles on the Turkish way to the Eu, as well as that 
of other candidate countries. some of the union’s problems concern 
the enlargement process directly (e.g. an imperfect Eu enlargement 
strategy). however, a lot of them are essentially Eu dilemmas that 
are simply more visible in the context of the union’s enlargement, 
especially as regards Turkey. The Turkish case gives a clear signal to 
Europeans that they must talk about finalité politique and carry out 
some reforms on the Eu level as well as revise many aspects of their 
economic and social policies on the national level. 
The key issue is to change the negative attitude of European pub-
lic opinion towards Eu membership for Turkey and the entire pro-
cess of Eu enlargement. it itself is a huge problem as it has a lot to do 
with the fears of European citizens regarding different processes in 
Europe. Additionally, it also has an impact on other Eu dilemmas – 
in the formal and normative or political dimensions. There are some 
solutions to European problems in the area analysed, although their 
implementation would be very difficult and possible only in the long 
term. A vital role should be played here by different groups in the 
member states (and Turkey itself), depending on the problem. in the 
most important socio-psychological dimension the key role must be 
played by European and Turkish civil society organizations – ngos, 
media or academicians.
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the CzeCh eu 
presIdenCy and 
turkey: Is more 
than the mInImum 
possIble? 
dAvid král
in January 2009 the Czech Republic assumed its first ever presi-dency over the Eu Council. Big expectations and big concerns are being attached to how the Czech republic will tackle its role 
of Eu leader. The Czech presidency comes at a time when the world 
economy is in the turmoil of a global economic crisis. Eu external 
relations are challenged in areas such as the resurgence of russia at 
its Eastern border, strained relations with China and the new us ad-
ministration taking over the leadership of the united states, the most 
important strategic ally and partner of the European union.
in the midst of this, the Eu is striving – though painfully enough 
– to complete its process of internal reform by pushing ahead for the 
continuing ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. At the same time it is 
carrying on with its most ambitious foreign policy tool – Eu enlarge-
ment. All these issues are to a large extent interlinked with the aspi-
rations of Turkey to negotiate its membership in the European union 
– the issue that the Czech government and its diplomats, whether 
they like it or not, will have to address while leading the Eu through 
these turbulent times. 
in this chapter we argue that despite the generally pro-enlarge-
ment drive of the current centre-right Czech government, one should 
not have too high expectations about Eu enlargement in general and 
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Turkey in particular. The relative lack of mutual interest on the part 
of Turkey and the Czech republic however, should not be used as an 
excuse for inaction on many fronts where, despite the expected lack 
of progress in the accession talks, the two parties have converging or 
possibly overlapping interests. The Czech leadership could be more 
creative in envisaging different ways in which Turkey should be en-
gaged. This in turn could have positive implications for the future of 
the accession process as such and contribute to renewed confidence 
between Turkey and the Eu in the long run. 
good will striking the wrong note?
An account of Czech external relations priorities for its Eu presi-
dency has to start with underlining the strong commitment of the 
current Czech government to carry on with Eu enlargement. The 
overall motto of the presidency – ‘Europe without barriers’ – implies 
the need not only for internal openness (in the sense of completion 
of the internal market and liberal intra-European economic space, in-
cluding removal of existing barriers), but also for outward openness. 
This also includes the continuing process of Eu enlargement and 
a more pro-active role for Europe on the world stage. Enlargement 
is singled out among the foreign policy priorities of the Presidency, 
included under its third priority area – ‘Europe in the World’. 
Also, the Czech government does not formally differentiate be-
tween countries in line for membership, attaching strong value to 
the conditionality principle (‘those who meet the criteria should be 
admitted’), although from the official statements of key politicians it 
can be deduced that somewhat stronger emphasis is put on the ac-
celerated accession of the Western Balkan countries and especially 
Croatia. All this seems to be good news for Turkey, and the expecta-
tions from the Czech presidency could thus be relatively high. This 
is even more since the Czech presidency will be followed by sweden, 
a big supporter of the European aspirations of Turkey. 
Czech public opinion still backs Eu enlargement quite strongly, 
with 62 % of the population supporting it according to the latest Euro-
barometer poll. Although one has to be cautious about its decreasing 
tendency, the drop is not strong enough yet to suggest that the trend 
is reversing. All the major political parties strongly favour continuing 
enlargement of the Eu, although with different degrees of enthusiasm, 
but again are unlikely to make a u-turn in the near future. 
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What hampers Czech determination to put enlargement at the heart 
of the Eu foreign policy agenda is the uncertain fate of the lisbon 
Treaty. For the Czech republic this situation is even more precarious, 
as the ratification process has not been completed yet with another 
constitutional review pending and the President’s signature missing. 
To anyone closely following developments at the Eu level the link be-
tween the Treaty’s fate and the future of enlargement cannot be more 
evident. The failure to have a clear vision of whether the Treaty can be 
adopted will hamper any substantial progress on the Eu enlargement 
front. The French president nicolas sarkozy when negotiating with 
the Czech Prime minister Topolánek bluntly suggested that, without 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in the Czech Republic, he would 
not back further expansion of the union. This point has been recent-
ly reiterated by other senior EU figures, including the (now former) 
President of the European Parliament hans gert Pöttering. Although 
the Czech government refuses a trade-off between the adoption of the 
lisbon Treaty and the continuation of the enlargement process, the 
reality of the current Eu is such that it will eventually be a trade-off. 
Moreover, in the first days of the Presidency, the Czechs were 
faced with arguably more pressing issues in the foreign policy arena 
than enlargement – the Gaza conflict and the gas crisis. This has 
consumed much Czech political and diplomatic energy. it seems as if 
among foreign policy priorities, enlargement is giving way to much 
more pressing issues and to crisis management rather than long-term 
strategic thinking. Eastern partnership, relations with russia and get-
ting the us on board for the Copenhagen global climate change sum-
mit seem to top the Czech agenda now. 
Selling enlargement will be more difficult to a public opinion al-
ready quite sceptical in Eu-15, one that can be further alienated by 
the bad shape of the European economy and the impact of the global 
economic crisis, surrounded by uncertainty as to when we will hit 
bottom. The controversy that surrounds Treaty ratification in the 
Czech parliament,1 and even more so the openly hostile attitude of 
1 The senate (upper Chamber of the Czech Parliament) referred the Trea-
ty for review of compatibility with the Czech Constitution. in november 
2008 the Court ruled that the Treaty is fully compatible with the Consti-
tution on the six points raised by the senate. however, the opposition 
from some ods senators remains quite strong, and thex might try to rel-
aunch the case on other points. Furthermore, President klaus signaled 
that he would not sign the Treaty before the positive outcome of a refe-
rendum is secured in ireland. 
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the country’s President václav klaus are likely to deprive the Czech 
leadership of the necessary leverage to push for a more ambitious 
and robust enlargement policy in the next half year, despite the fact 
that it could be backed by many of the Eu governments. This is 
coupled with the lame duck leadership of the outgoing European 
Commission, which is unlikely to be a decisive driving force for en-
largement in the coming months. Thus, Czech politicians find them-
selves in a strange dilemma when they generally strongly support Eu 
enlargement, but at the same time a strong part of the political class 
is considerably opposed to the Treaty that should pave the way for it. 
A more articulate and visible determination to achieve lisbon Treaty 
ratification would be highly desirable if the ambitions of the Czech 
presidency in the area of Eu enlargement are not to be in vain. 
is tUrkey relevant to the agenda of the presidenCy?
For Czech policy makers, Turkish accession is still a rather hap-
hazard issue in which they do not seem to have any vested inter-
est, apart from having general pro-enlargement attitudes. Bilateral 
relations are not strained by any particular controversies. This has 
a both positive and negative impact on the potential for closer co-
operation during the Eu presidency. on the one hand, there is noth-
ing that would hamper potential progress (both in terms of accession 
negotiations and Eu-Turkey co-operation in areas such as foreign 
policy or energy). on the other hand, there are no strong stakes and 
incentives on either side. 
in the past few years the Czech republic and Turkey have en-
joyed flourishing economic relations. Turkey is a priority country for 
Czech exports. The turnout of mutual trade exceeded 1.5 billion usd 
in 20072, keeping Turkey among the top 20 trading partners, which 
reflects the size of the Turkish economy in the global context. Still, 
many economists argue that mutual economic relations are below 
their potential. it seems that for the highly export oriented Czech 
economy Turkey represents a potentially very interesting market, 
especially if the traditional West European markets (especially ger-
many) continue to be hit by the current economic crisis. The gradual 
progress of the crisis from the West to the East is, however, already 




months ago. Economic growth in Turkey might drop below 2 per 
cent in 2009, as the oECd has warned3. it is doubtful whether under 
these conditions Turkey can substitute for vast Western European 
markets for Czech exporters at short notice. 
 The big economic players, especially the majority state-owned 
company ČEz (Czech Power Company) is looking for possibilities of 
further expansion into the Turkish energy market, after some acqui-
sitions that have already been made by ČEz4 and which are a logical 
geographical way of expansion for this company, focused as it has 
been in recent years on the Balkans and Eastern Europe5. This can 
have implications even at a political level, especially in the area of 
energy diversification and security, in which both the Czech Republic 
and the majority state-owned ČEz have strong stakes. Businesses, 
and especially exporters, are becoming stronger political stakehold-
ers on the Czech scene, as their co-ordinated push in the course of 
2008 for a swift adoption of the Euro has shown, and it will be in-
teresting to see whether businesses can potentially prove to be the 
major driving force towards more intensive relations with Turkey and 
the main advocates of Turkish Eu accession in the future.
speaking in political terms, Turkey is very much a non-issue in 
the current Czech discourse. The emotional arguments common in 
other Eu countries relating to cultural differences or historical griev-
ances are largely missing, or used only occasionally by individual 
politicians rather than parties or major political forces, and by some 
organizations that do not represent mainstream discourse. There is 
no important Turkish minority in the Czech republic feeding into 
debate as there is in some neighbouring countries, notably germany 
and Austria, nor a significant Muslim minority such as fuels public 
debate in countries such as France or the netherlands. As a Czech 
‘national’ discourse on Turkey is non-existent or strongly underde-
veloped, political actors tend to follow arguments already present 
in other countries, most importantly in the neighbouring countries 
– germany and Austria.
3 Today’s zaman: Turkey’s Economic growth will drop Below Two Per-
cent, oEdC Warns, 3 February 2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=159810
4 in February 2009 CEz will acquire one of the electricity distribution ne-
tworks in Turkey, after takeover of the formerly state-owned sEdAs com-
pany. This will be the biggest Czech investment in Turkey to date. 
5 Acquisitions include investments in Poland, hungary, Bulgaria, roma-
nia, Bosnia and herzegovina, serbia and Turkey
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At a political level, however, the ods-led government has been 
sending rather strong signals to Turkey. During an official visit to 
Ankara in october 2008 prime minister Topolánek fully endorsed 
Turkish aspirations to join the Eu, claiming that the Czech repub-
lic is ‘supporting Turkish membership in the Eu unconditionally, 
not being in favour of any kind of substitutive membership, second 
class membership, privileged partnership or different programmes 
in the framework of the union for the mediterranean or other instru-
ments’6. during his meeting with Ali Babacan in november 2008 
karel schwarzenberg, the foreign minister, highlighted that the 
Czech republic would like to speed up the negotiation process and 
open at least two other negotiating chapters during its Presidency.7. 
on the other hand, due to the low intensity of mutual relations and 
the lack of genuine interest in the Turkish issue, the Czech republic 
is rather unlikely to achieve a major breakthrough in the sense of 
unfreezing the eight key internal market chapters in Eu-Turkey ac-
cession talks. its leverage to facilitate a deal on the solution to the 
Cyprus problem, which is the major pre-condition for unblocking 
the current negotiation deadlock on these issues, is very limited, and 
it is not a government priority. likewise, the Czech leadership seems 
to have no leverage on France’s continuing to oppose the opening of 
those chapters that, in the French view, imply full-fledged Turkish 
membership of the Eu. it also remains questionable to what extent 
the rhetoric of the current government reflects the reality of what 
seems to be a general political consensus on Turkey. it can be argued 
that the Czech attitude to Turkey is more complex. At first glance 
there is a large degree of alignment among the mainstream political 
parties in support of Turkish accession. The only notable exception 
is the junior partner in the government – the Christian democrats 
(KDU-ČSL). Although they were never outspokenly against Turkish 
membership, when the negotiation framework between the Eu and 
Turkey was agreed in 2005 they pushed the government to allow 
a clause confirming the open-ended nature of the accession negotia-





8 král, kazmierkiewicz: ‘Turkey and ukraine: Wanted or not? Central Eu-
ropean Reflections of Their EU Membership Perspectives’, page 18. EU-
roPEum institute for European Policy, 2006. 
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The most important variable is how the two major parties – the 
ODS and ČSSD – view the prospect of Turkish accession in relation 
to internal developments under way in the Eu in relation to progress 
towards closer political integration. At the moment, they both sup-
port Turkey in its efforts to join the Eu. The tricky thing about this 
consensus is that the motives and calculations underpinning their 
thinking are rather different, if not completely opposed. To illustrate 
– the ods supports Turkey for a number of reasons, one of them 
being a strong role for Turkey in nATo that could lead to better 
Eu-nATo co-operation and a strengthening of the Atlantic element 
in EsdP. For the social democrats, who are in the long run much 
more in favour of a stronger EsdP independent of nATo (or at least 
the us), strengthening the links to nATo through Turkish accession 
to the Eu does not necessarily have to be a strong incentive. some 
members of ods (for instance Jan zahradil, ods leader in the Eu-
ropean Parliament) believe that the accession of Turkey will lead the 
Eu to change priorities in budgetary spending and to revise its most 
costly policies, such as the CAP, as with Turkey on board it will not 
be sustainable according to the current system9. 
While the ČSSD is in principle positive towards some changes in 
Eu expenditure like cutting agricultural subsidies, in the long run it 
is not in favour of reducing the European budget, which in the event 
of Turkish accession might be an option pursued by many Eu coun-
tries not willing to pay too much for Turkey. many people in the ods 
tend to see that with Turkey on board it will be more difficult to pro-
ceed quickly with building a stronger, more political or perhaps even 
federal Europe. They also see Turkey as a potential ally in balancing 
the dominant role of the Franco-German tandem. The ČSSD is in the 
long run interested in building a strong political Europe and should 
the potential Turkish accession to the Eu hamper this aim, it might 
be faced with a dilemma. i would think that the social democrats 
would rather opt for a stronger, politically integrated Europe. 
The current ČSSD leadership also seems to be more liable to sway 
with public opinion on many controversial issues. in terms of pub-
lic perceptions, and despite the generally strong pro-enlargement 
sentiments in the Czech society, Turkey is definitely not the most 
favoured country for a future expansion of the union. According 
to Eurobarometer 66 (published in the autumn of 2006), only 30% 
of Czechs support the accession of Turkey. This puts the Czech re-
9 ibid, pg. 25
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public slightly above the Eu-25 average (with 28% support). But it 
also makes Czech public opinion converge with attitudes in Western 
Europe rather than in some other new Eu member states which ex-
hibit significantly higher support (e.g. 43% in Slovenia, 40% in Po-
land, 39% in hungary or 35% in lithuania). The analysis of public 
opinion further shows that Turkish membership tends to be more 
supported by younger people, by voters of right wing parties as well 
as people holding executive or managerial positions, while left-wing 
voters tend to be more opposed10. should public attitudes remain 
the same and public opinion remains without substantive shifts, the 
attitude of the social democratic party will probably be much more 
lukewarm about the prospect of Turkish accession. 
 it looks as if the Czech presidency of the Eu will not take a strong 
lead on Turkey during its half year of glory. still, there should be 
greater exploration of how there can be more interest taken in Turkey 
during the Czech presidency, not because of the accession process 
itself but because of other potential issues that are going to feature 
high in the Czech presidency’s programme. There are at least three 
areas of external action among Czech priorities for an Eu where Tur-
key is potentially a strong stakeholder and partner: the energy policy 
of the Eu, improving nATo and Eu relations and Eu policy towards 
countries and regions bearing a high strategic and security impor-
tance for Turkey. looking more closely at the possible overlaps and 
convergence of interests of the Czech republic (as the presidency 
country) and Turkey might provide some guidance for building mu-
tually beneficial co-operation and engagement, despite the stalemate 
in the accession process. 
energy: tUrkey as a diffiCUlt bUt indispensable partner? 
one area where the Czech republic should certainly engage 
strongly with Turkey is energy security. The bitter experience of the 
ukrainian – russian gas dispute of January 2009 has shown how 
much Europe is vulnerable to external pressures, and that it can eas-
ily find itself a hostage to disputes among countries outside the EU. 
10 Eurobarometer 66, national report for the Czech republic, published 
in autumn 2006. it is interesting to see that the support for Turkey goes 
hand in hand with support for e.g. the lisbon Treaty (it is mostly sup-
ported by the same kind of social groups, except that in the latter case it 
doesn’t correlate with the positions of the parties they vote for). 
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This bitter experience, however, has its positive sides too. it plays 
well into the plans of Prime minister Topolánek in his attempts to 
create a European framework for external energy supplies and se-
curing new transportation routes for natural gas and oil from the 
Caspian Basin and potentially also from Central Asia and other areas. 
The long-term goal of the Czech republic is to limit European depen-
dence on supplies of both key energy commodities from russia, with 
the underlying assumption that the current russian leadership is too 
prone to use energy as a political weapon. some people in the Czech 
government believe that the whole dispute of January 2009 was pri-
marily about discrediting the ukraine in the Eu and undermining 
the new initiatives that the Czech Presidency is planning to launch 
ceremonially, such as the Eastern partnership. moreover, the similar 
‘accident’ of the short interruption of supplies from russia through 
the ‘Friendship’ pipeline in July 2008 just after the Czech repub-
lic signed a missile defence treaty with the United States confirmed 
many senior figures in the current Czech administration in their view 
of the enduring policy of the kremlin of using its control of energy 
resources for political ends. For this, the question of finding viable 
supply and transportation alternatives as well as developing a more 
consensual approach and solidarity at the EU level to diversification 
of external supplies of strategic forms of energy becomes a top prior-
ity for the Czech government in the Eu presidency11. 
After the bilateral deal between germany and russia on the north 
stream pipeline that was heavily criticised particularly in Central and 
Eastern Europe, much of the debates now focus on the so-called 
southern Energy Corridor. The Czech republic now faces two com-
peting projects in the Eu aimed at securing the southern transporta-
tion route of Central Asian and Caspian gas to the Eu. one of them is 
the russian-backed south stream initiative, aiming at bringing natu-
ral gas from Central Asia and russia under the Black sea to Bulgaria 
and then further to greece and italy, with a northward extension to 
serbia, hungary and Austria. This project is a russian initiative, re-
sulting from bilateral negotiations between russia and the countries 
through which the new pipeline is to run (Bulgaria, serbia, hungary, 
Austria, with possible extensions to greece and italy). 
11 For a further reference, see for instance the speech of Pm Topolánek at 




The other project is the nabucco pipeline, developed and sup-
ported by the Eu (under the Trans-European Energy network pro-
gramme), which would bring natural gas from the Trans-Caspian 
gas pipeline via Turkey to Europe. For obvious reasons, the south 
stream project is rejected by the current Czech government. The 
main grounds on which the Czechs oppose it is that it uses the ‘di-
vide and rule’ tactics of the kremlin to kill the nascent energy secu-
rity consensus among Eu member states, to continue making bilat-
eral deals as in case of the north stream and to enhance its political 
presence in the Black sea region, exerting more pressure on those 
countries that might want to look to Brussels rather than to moscow. 
For political reasons the Czechs tend to favour the nabucco proj-
ect because it is aimed at limiting European dependence on russia 
in both source and transportation. The Czech support for nabucco 
is, however, currently hampered by several factors. unlike the south 
Stream, where Russia has secured the sources to fill the pipeline 
with enough natural gas from Central Asian countries through con-
tracts with individual source countries, no such supplies have been 
secured for nabucco except for Azerbaijan, and these are not going 
to suffice in the medium to long term. Although there are various 
possibilities of involving other source countries, many of them have 
not been welcomed enthusiastically in Europe, or have met with 
outright refusal. For instance iran expressed interest as a potential 
supplier but Europe did not take this offer up because of the strong 
opposition from the united states. moreover, the recent negotiations 
on nabucco showed the lukewarm attitude of Turkmenistan towards 
the whole project, as Turkmenistan sees it also as too political since it 
tries to bypass russia, something which was clearly articulated dur-
ing the recent visit of Turkmen president karimov to Bulgaria12. 
Where does Turkey come into play in the case of the nabucco 
pipeline? naturally, it is a key transit country in the event of the pipe-
line’s being built, regardless of where the gas eventually comes from 
– whether from the Caspian sea, from iran or iraq. But there is quite 
significant opposition, or at least hesitation, to the project expressed 
from Ankara over the recent months. Firstly, Turkey has expressed 
some concerns over insufficient sources of gas being secured for the 
Nabucco pipeline, with the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz field not being 
able to meet the demand that would make nabucco worth investing 
12 Source: www.businessinfo.cz (official Czech portal for entrepreneurship 
and export) 
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in13. This has even led to some Turkish senior figures (such as for-
eign minister Babacan or BOTAŞ CEO Duzyol) arguing that Russian 
gas should also be used as a source for nabucco14. This argument is 
likely to alienate the Czech presidency, as it runs contrary to the rai-
son d’être of Czech support for the project. secondly, Turkey does not 
seem to be too happy with being only a transit country for Caspian 
gas and collecting transit charges but wants to try to maximize its 
commercial interest in participation. This risks delaying the start of 
the project and puts it at a comparative disadvantage to the russian-
backed south stream. if the Czech republic remains determined to 
support the Nabucco project politically, winning the confidence of 
Turkey in the project and heightening concerns about insufficient 
sources to fill the pipeline are essential. At the same time, Turkey 
has to realize the costs of playing its opposition too hard. if practical 
obstacles continue and other countries were to lose interest in the vi-
ability of nabucco, it would be Turkey that would suffer the biggest 
loss because it would be excluded from transit altogether15. 
Thirdly, we have recently witnessed attempts to link Turkish sup-
port for the nabucco pipeline to Eu-Turkey negotiations. during his 
visit to Brussels Prime minister Erdogan reiterated that if Turkey is to 
back the project, the Eu should move forward in opening the energy 
chapter in accession negotiations16. This might open a window of 
opportunity for the Czech Presidency. As the energy chapter is not 
linked directly to the internal market and customs union as are the 
others that are being blocked by Cyprus, the Czechs could possibly 
convince it to lift its veto. At the same time, it would assure the Czech 
Presidency of the support of a key partner for the nabucco project, 
not least because the nabucco summit in Budapest backed the sign-
ing of an intergovernmental agreement in the first half of 200917. 
Furthermore, the Czech Presidency is about to organize the Eu-
Caspian summit in may 2009 with the countries that can act as poten-
13 This concern was voiced during Pm Erdogan’s visit to Brussels in Janu-
ary 2009, as well as by for example the Turkish state-owned gas compa-
ny BOTAŞ (see also http://www.businessinfo.cz/cz/aktuality-z-teritorii/
turecka-firma-bota-k-projektu-plynovodu-nabucco/14630/) 
14 http://www.templetonthorp.com/en/news77.html
15 The south stream project (which is the most likely alternative to nabuc-
co) is intended to bypass Turkey by routing the pipeline on the Black sea 




tial suppliers for nabucco, including Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and 
kazakhstan as potential source countries and Turkey and georgia as 
potential transit countries. This is likely to further alienate russia, and 
to some extent iran as well, as the whole project will bypass them. 
in this respect, it will be quite important to keep Turkey on board, 
not only because of its interest as a potential transit country, but also 
because of its leverage in the region as such. The worst that the Eu 
could hope for is to see an iranian-russian energy alliance emerging 
in the East, hoping to exert pressure over what the southern corridor 
for supplies of gas to Europe should look like. The improvement of 
relations between iran and Turkey in recent years could be used as 
a means to reduce the potential opposition of iran to a Trans-Caspian 
pipeline18. The opposition to potential engagement with iran on the 
European side might also not be so strong in the upcoming years with 
the prospect of improving the relations between iran and the new us 
administration, and Turkey can be used as a mediator to facilitate po-
tential inclusion of iran as a source country for the southern gas cor-
ridor. Furthermore, iraq is being singled out as a potential supplier for 
the nabucco pipeline19. This increases even further the potential of 
Turkey as the energy hub of the region. keeping Turkey engaged even 
when negotiating with the supplier countries is thus an important op-
portunity that should not be missed by the Czech presidency. 
the CzeCh repUbliC, tUrkey and esdp
in the area of European security and defence Policy (EsdP), the op-
portunities for progress during the Czech Eu presidency seem quite 
promising. At first sight, the Czech Republic and Turkey seem to have 
different goals and starting points. The Czech republic is part of EsdP 
and nATo and as such participates in all the decision-making in these 
two organizations. Turkey has been denied access to EsdP decision-
18 Turkey and iran signed a memorandum of understanding, as well as a 
Framework Agreement, in the area of energy co-operation. however, no 
Turkish investments in iran are envisaged until the political controversi-
es surrounding Iran are settled (BOTAŞ statement to the Czech Ambas-
sy in Ankara, http://www.businessinfo.cz/cz/aktuality-z-teritorii/turec-
ka-firma-bota-k-projektu-plynovodu-nabucco/14630/)
19 The main concerns relating to possible inclusion of iraq as a source 
country for Nabucco are non-clarified competencies between the central 
government and the Kurdish Autonomous Authority over the gas fields 
in northern iraq. 
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making (as a non-Eu member of nATo), as a result of which it has been 
blocking Eu-nATo co-operation on automatic Eu access to nATo plan-
ning capacities for crisis management. But Turkey is eager to be includ-
ed in EsdP decision-making, especially as many EsdP operations have 
been taking place in Turkey’s immediate vicinity (for instance Western 
Balkans, Caucasus or moldova) and Turkish participation has proven 
to be a huge asset to many of the EsdP operations. But Turkey is not 
willing to participate further without having a substantial (if not full-
fledged) say in the decision-making. The current Czech government, 
on the other hand, is not overly enthusiastic about emancipating EsdP 
totally from its dependence on nATo and is determined to put nATo 
back at the heart of Eu security arrangements. Taken either way, how-
ever, both countries share the same goal – improving the communica-
tion and co-operation between the two organizations. 
The Czech determination to push for the resuscitation of the role 
of nATo seems to have more practical connotations, namely with re-
gard to nATo’s kFor mission in kosovo. Turkey has been blocking 
the adoption of the updated version of the operational plan for this 
mission, making its approval conditional on a broader discussion of 
arrangements between nATo and the Eu. settling this issue com-
plies with twin interests of the Czech republic in both the Western 
Balkans, where regional stability and especially the future of kosovo 
are at stake, and the improvement of Eu-nATo relations that is an-
other imperative of the Czech presidency. It is difficult to imagine at 
the moment whether the Czech republic can come up with a con-
structive proposal to unblock the Eu-nATo deadlock and what ex-
actly the Eu will be willing to offer to Turkey to give the Eu better 
access to the operational and defence capabilities of nATo, given 
that talks on the Turkish involvement in the EsdP planning process 
collapsed relatively recently – as lately as June 2007. one hopeful de-
velopment might be overcoming the opposition of Cyprus, facilitated 
by the progress of bi-communal talks between greek and Turkish Cy-
priots, although it remains to be seen what progress is actually made 
in the course of 2009. The other one might be the 60th anniversary 
of nATo, where the symbolic unblocking of Eu-nATo co-operation 
could be viewed as a sign of rapprochement between the two orga-
nizations. in any case, the unwillingness of Turkey to commit itself 
to continuing involvement in EsdP operations will seriously hamper 
the effectiveness of EsdP in the long term. Firstly, Turkey has in the 
past years improved its defence capabilities to an extent that the Eu 
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cannot afford to ignore, especially in view of their potential inclusion 
in the European rapid reaction Force20. secondly, Turkish opposition 
to EsdP operations in its immediate vicinity, such as the Balkans, the 
Caucasus or the middle East, would seriously undermine the effec-
tiveness and legitimacy of such operations from the point of view of 
Turkish security concerns and Turkey’s position as a nATo ally, pos-
sibly resulting in further alienation between the Eu and nATo. This 
issue turns out to be even more pressing, as the bulk of future EsdP 
operations are likely to be in some of the hotspots where Turkey has 
legitimate security interests. Thirdly, the continuing exclusion from 
EsdP might cause Turkey to consider alternative security solutions 
outside the EsdP and nATo frameworks, for instance by developing 
informal or even institutionalized security dialogue with russia. 
All these points give further incentives to the Czech presidency 
to push for the unblocking of Eu-nATo co-operation. it would make 
nATo more relevant to the Eu (and EsdP) by giving it access to 
nATo capabilities, leading over time to better political co-operation 
between the two. Turkey will be once again firmly anchored in the 
Western security structures, enabling both organizations to benefit 
fully from its increased military capabilities, and limiting the Turkish 
appetite for seeking alternative security arrangements. 
the CzeCh presidenCy, tUrkey and the geographiCal  
areas of Co-operation
The two areas where potential co-operation between the Czech 
presidency and Turkey would be extremely important and beneficial 
can also translate into a more focused co-operation towards certain 
areas and regions where Turkish interests and the foreign policy pri-
orities of the Czech presidency overlap, despite both countries’ lack 
of recognition of such overlaps. looking at the list of Czech priorities 
in the area of foreign policy, one can see that all of them are areas of 
particular interest to Turkish foreign policy, too. 
Transatlantic relations
The first area relevant to both actors are Transatlantic relations. 
The current context is predominantly determined by the undergoing 
20 Tatli Erdal: ‘Turkey Turns Cold to European defense: implications for Wes-
tern security’. The Washington institute for near East Policy, June 2008
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change of presidential administration in the united states. This is 
extremely important both for the Czech republic’s Eu presidency as 
well as for Turkey and its foreign policy.
undoubtedly, the Czech republic will try to use its position as 
a strongly Atlanticist country in the Eu to meet the huge expectations 
that Europeans have in relation to the incoming obama administra-
tion and put the transatlantic agenda at the heart of its presidency 
priorities in the foreign policy arena. The presidency will have to ad-
dress a variety of issues in which Europeans and Americans did not 
find a common language under the previous administration: energy 
and climate change, approach to international law and organizations, 
balancing soft and hard power in international relations and many 
others, such as the topical issue of the global financial crisis. The 
Czechs are also likely to try to use American support for further Eu 
enlargement and perhaps make it more credible in relation to more 
sceptical European countries. The question now is where Turkey fits 
into this. The previously articulated support for Turkish accession 
on the part of the usA was not met with overwhelming understand-
ing in many European countries, so the Czechs should use different 
tactics here. 
much of this has to do with expectations of improvement in us – 
Turkish relations as well. These have been quite cool in recent years, 
following the Turkish parliament’s opposition to using Turkish air-
space and soil in the campaign against iraq, as well as subsequent us 
support for kurdish autonomy in northern iraq and disagreements 
over preventive Turkish strikes against the Pkk. As developments in 
iraq seem to be taking a more positive turn and with the promise of 
the us pulling out of the country in the near future, the prospects 
of subsequent improvement in us – Turkish relations seem to be 
realistic, with the usA adopting a more balanced approach towards 
iraq, including less vocal support for kurdish autonomy. This can 
be used by the Czech presidency and other countries in the Eu sup-
portive of Turkey’s membership bid (especially sweden, which takes 
the Presidency after the Czechs) to exert concerted pressure with 
the us on the government in Ankara to pursue reforms and com-
ply with its obligations under the accession negotiations. This has to 
be done carefully, as public opinion in Turkey is currently relatively 
hostile towards both the united states and the European union21. 
21 see for example the annual Transatlantic Trends survey, published an-
nually by the german marshall Fund, available at www.gmfus.org 
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unblocking the nATo – Eu deadlock over access to planning and 
defence capabilities, which has already been discussed, would be 
another possible step forward. it would not make much sense for 
the Czech republic to try to convince the new us administration 
to exert pressure on individual Eu capitals in support of Turkish 
membership. it should rather focus on improving us – Eu – Turkey 
relations and mutual restoration of confidence among the parties in-
volved. Both the Eu and the us should send signals to involve Tur-
key in various regional initiatives, especially in the middle East and 
the Caucasus. This could improve their standing in the sight of the 
AkP government, as it would be a sign of recognition of Turkey as 
a strong regional actor and stabilising element. it would also show 
that the Eu and us (particularly the former) do not only engage with 
Turkey when it is indispensable, e.g. in the area of energy security as 
was explained previously. 
The Middle East
The Czech republic has been neither a strong player nor a strong 
stakeholder in the middle East, especially in the israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and the broader concept of regional stability including Syr-
ia, iraq and iran. Turkey, on the other hand, naturally plays a very 
strong regional role, which arguably has even increased in recent 
years with the AkP government in power. 
right at the beginning of the Presidency, the Czech government 
was confronted with the need to address the crisis in gaza, which 
broke out in the last days of 2008 and made a very harsh start for the 
Czech Presidency. The Eu delegation to the middle East, headed by 
Foreign minister karel schwarzenberg, did not manage to strike an 
armistice deal between Israel and Hamas, and confirmed the idea of 
the Czech republic’s not having strong leverage over regional devel-
opments. 
moreover, the Czech republic’s attitude towards the middle East 
conflict has changed significantly compared to the position of com-
munist Czechoslovakia, which tended to adopt strongly pro-Palestin-
ian stances. in the course of the 1990s the country focused on build-
ing strong relations with and political support for israel, although 
Czech foreign policy claims to be in favour of a balanced approach 
and even support for an independent Palestinian state, naturally un-
der very stringent conditions. strong links to israel tend to be the 
main imperative of the Czech approach to the middle East, demon-
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strated by Prime Minister Topolánek’s official visit to Israel in March 
2009. he expressed support for israel and condemned the activities 
of hamas, hezbollah, syria and iran for trying to undermine region-
al stability and the peace process22. The Czech mEP Jana hybášková 
became head of the European Parliament delegation to israel and in 
the European Parliament has significantly raised the Czech profile in 
relation to the middle East. regarding the Czech presidency agen-
da, perhaps the most significant items in this respect are the Czech 
plans to upgrade relations between israel and the Eu. israel is being 
singled out as one of the focal points of the Presidency in the foreign 
policy arena, given the expiration of the European neighbourhood 
Policy Action Plan in April 2009. 
This largely pro-israeli position of the Czech government now 
causes some substantial problems. The statements of the Prime min-
ister’s spokesman in January 2009, claiming that the israeli strikes 
in gaza were an act of legitimate self-defence, not only caused a lot 
of indignation not only among the leaders of countries neighbour-
ing israel but also precipitated the protests of their ambassadors in 
Prague. it was also very negatively received by many Eu counter-
parts, not least its presidency predecessor France as well as the presi-
dency successor sweden. 
it is likely that such a Czech position will complicate further ini-
tiatives of the Czech presidency vis-à-vis israel such as hosting the 
first EU-Israel summit, which would be a sign of upgrading the mu-
tual relationship and perhaps winning more trust and support for 
the Eu in israel. it is very doubtful whether the other Eu member 
states would agree to this after an escalation of violence in gaza, 
many civilian casualties and a situation close to humanitarian cri-
sis. similarly, Czech plans to upgrade the relations with israel in the 
framework of EnP are put in doubt by questions over the willing-
ness of fellow Eu member states to give the green light in view of the 
events in question. 
The relations between Turkey and israel have also traditionally 
been very good, especially in military and intelligence co-operation. 
However, the conflict in Gaza led Prime Minister Erdogan to clash 
quite strongly with israeli President Peres at the World Economic 
Forum in davos, where Erdogan quite bluntly condemned improper 
use of force by the israeli military. This points to a quite sharp con-
trast in approach to the conflict between Turkish and Czech foreign 
22 http://zpravy.ods.cz/prispevek.php?id=6399
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policy, despite the fact that the Czechs are trying to play a more neu-
tral role because of the Presidency. 
in recent years, moreover, we witness an overall shift of Turkish 
foreign policy in the region, resulting in Turkey’s becoming a more 
credible partner for many muslim countries in the middle East, in-
cluding syria, the Palestinian Authority and iran. The great achieve-
ment has been the talks on the settlement of the future of the golan 
heights between israel and syria, where Turkey assumed the role 
of a mediator, something that the Eu could barely have hoped for23. 
The ambition of Turkey to play a stronger regional role has also been 
illustrated by the approval of sending troops for the un mission in 
lebanon (uniFil) in september 2006, despite the fact that this was 
a decision quite heavily contested both by the parliamentary opposi-
tion and public opinion. Apart from this, it showed the Turkish com-
mitment to supporting the Eu, which was supposed to contribute 
the bulk of the uniFil force, although the European contribution 
turned out to be much more modest in the end. 
From what has been said, it seems evident that both the Czech 
Republic and Turkey are aiming to raise their profile in Middle East-
ern affairs. The former mainly because of the implications attached 
to the presidency agenda, where it has to address more seriously 
issues such as the middle East peace process, syria or iran. in the 
latter case it is mainly because of the rediscovery of its role as a re-
gional power and because of its legitimate security interests in the 
region. It would definitely be beneficial if the two actors could en-
visage ways of co-operating more closely in relation to the middle 
East. unfortunately, the recent developments seem to point to the 
positions of the two actors diverging rather than converging. more-
over, the Czech interest in the middle East is unlikely to go be-
yond anything that can be called crisis management. Czech foreign 
policy basically gave up playing any role more active than this in 
the mediterranean union to the French, partially also in hopes of 
winning French support for the upgrading of Eu-israel relations, 
which are now in doubt. The overall strategic focus of the Czech 
Presidency is likely to be on Eastern Partnership. The middle East 
is hardly an area in which a closer Czech – Turkish co-operation can 
be envisaged under current circumstances. 
23 The Turkish mediation was, however, suspended in december 2008 due 
to the conflict in Gaza. 
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The Balkans 
similarly, policy towards the Western Balkans features very high 
on the Czech agenda for the Eu. This underpins the long-standing 
aspiration of the Czech republic to achieve stability in the region 
and to anchor these countries firmly on their way to the EU. One 
can assume that Turkish aspirations will be the same. The Balkans 
are the traditional field of operations for Turkish foreign policy, mo-
tivated by the geographical, cultural and historical proximity and the 
direct impact of developments on Turkey. The Turkish involvement 
can be illustrated by its participation in the kFor mission in kosovo, 
as well as a number of other Eu-led missions such as EuFor AlTEA 
in Bosnia and herzegovina. Also, Turkish investments in the West-
ern Balkans are not negligible, which makes Turkey even more of 
a policy driver in the region.
The position of Turkey towards the region is, however, a bit awk-
ward. it is already an actor in the region, due to its military and ci-
vilian presence and economic interests. At the same time, however, 
it is a competitor with almost all the countries in the region in its 
aspirations to join the European union. in what ways is it important? 
naturally, progress in the Eu-Turkey negotiations predetermines the 
behaviour of Turkey towards the Western Balkans. if the negotia-
tions between the Eu and Turkey go well, or at least if there is some 
progress, it is more likely that Turkey will be aligning with Eu posi-
tions in the region rather than trying to follow unilateral strategies 
or interests. if not, Turkey can become an actor that undermines the 
European approach, because it will lose the incentive to pull in the 
same direction as the Eu. in any case, the Czech republic should 
stick to its current position, which is not to decouple the Turkish Eu 
accession from the rest of Eu enlargement agenda Eu (particularly 
when it comes to Croatia). This might convince the current Turkish 
leadership that there is no particular preference on cultural or his-
torical grounds for some countries in the accession process, which in 
return would keep Turkey positively engaged towards developments 
in the Western Balkans, and would more likely make Turkey support 
the Eu approach. 
The Black Sea Region and the Caucasus
in relation to Black sea synergy, the Czech government and for-
eign office are rather sceptical towards the concept as it might po-
tentially undermine the EnP, and especially the Eastern Partnership 
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initiative, which enjoys strong Czech support and which will be de-
veloped further under the Czech presidency with the first summit 
in the format of Eu-Eastern partnership countries (27+6)24. obvious-
ly, Turkey is not included in the Eastern partnership, which makes 
sense, as Turkey is a candidate country with a structurally different 
status from the Ukraine. But in many ways it would be beneficial to 
include Turkey in the Eastern partnership with observer or ‘associ-
ated’ status25. Firstly, Turkey borders on the two countries involved 
in the partnership – georgia and Armenia, enjoys strong historical, 
cultural and linguistic ties to another country- Azerbaijan, and finds 
itself in the strategic vicinity of the ukraine because the two coun-
tries are the largest Black sea littoral states. The recent psychological 
rapprochement when President güll visited Armenia gives a ray of 
hope for a continuing improvement of relations, where the Eastern 
partnership could prove a useful platform giving more credibility 
because of the Eu involvement.26 The very good relations with Azer-
baijan can be used in favour of the Eu, which needs Azerbaijan since 
at the moment it is the only reliable and committed supplier of natu-
ral gas for the southern Energy Corridor. on the other hand, the 
inclusion of Turkey and exclusion of russia (even as observers) from 
the Eastern partnership is most likely to be viewed negatively if not 
refused outright by russia and most probably many other Eu mem-
ber states that enjoy ostensibly highly amicable relations with the 
Eu’s biggest Eastern neighbour. The argument which can be used 
for the inclusion of Turkey and non-inclusion of russia can be, pre-
cisely, that Turkey enjoys structurally different relations with the Eu 
as a potential member while russia does not. A possible reason for 
a hesitation on the part of Turkey about being included in the East-
ern Partnership on a more permanent basis might be the perception 
that this is yet another way to exclude Turkey from Eu member-
ship. The counter-argument could be that Turkey is also included 
24 The summit will be held in Prague on 7 may 2009 and will include the 
representatives (heads of state and government) of all the Eu member 
states and those of the ukraine, Belarus, moldova, georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan. 
25 The Commission Communication elaborating on the original Polish – 
Swedish Initiative, published on 3 December 2008, opens the floor to 
the inclusion of other countries in the work of thematic platforms, initi-
atives and panels on a case by case basis. 
26 See Duleba, A.; Najšlová, L.; Benč, V.; Bilčík, V.: The Reform of the Eu-
ropean neighborhood Policy. rC sFPA: Bratislava, 2008.
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in the union for the mediterranean and this does not preclude the 
Eu membership prospect, as the Czech Prime minister Topolánek 
reiterated. 
Perhaps the most challenging issue at the moment is that the East-
ern Partnership is not really filled with substance. It is supposedly up 
to the Czech presidency to give it a boost with concrete policy initia-
tives prior to and during the first summit. At this stage it could also 
lead to more concrete thinking about whether and in what ways it 
would make sense to include Turkey and in what ways, and whether 
a more permanent inclusion of third countries is actually desirable 
and acceptable to the member states. 
in any case, the Czech republic should have a strategic interest 
in keeping Turkey strongly engaged as a potential counterbalance 
to Russian influence. The EU views itself as a strong player in the 
Black sea region and in the Caucasus, but in reality it is russia and 
Turkey that matter much more. The realpolitik in the region seems 
to be shifting more and more in favour of russia, especially after the 
conflict in Georgia in the summer of 2008, and perhaps even more so 
after the ukrainian – russian gas dispute. keeping Turkey on the Eu-
ropean part of the Black sea chessboard can again swing the balance 
of power in favour of the Eu, or at least enhance it. it is also possible 
that Turkey will become strongly engaged for a number of reasons: 
because it will not like to see its position as a reliable energy corridor 
to Europe endangered, and because it will not like to see the in-
creased russian presence in the region, including a military build-up 
in its immediate vicinity (for instance in south ossetia). The potential 
problems that might emerge between russia and the ukraine over 
the status of the Russian Black Sea fleet will probably make Turkey 
even more suspicious of a future russian presence. This might again 
bring Turkey closer to Europe than ever before. 
ConClUsion
it is generally not assumed that the Czech republic will achieve 
much during its presidency in relation in Turkey in terms of a sub-
stantial breakthrough in the Eu accession negotiations, settlement of 
the Cyprus issue or steering Turkey towards more progress in terms 
of internal, Eu-conditioned reforms. moreover, this process is more 
in the hands of the Commission than the Presidency, and the Com-
mission will be weak and unwilling to take politically strong and far-
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reaching decisions with its end of term approaching rapidly. how-
ever, due to its role in the Council the Presidency will have a strong 
drive in areas linked to the external action of the Eu. reviewing the 
priorities of the Czech presidency for Eu foreign relations, one can 
see a striking overlap with many issues that are of vital interest to 
Turkish foreign policy. This opens interesting options where a closer 
dialogue and alignment with Turkey might open new opportunities 
for the Czech presidency also.
it is doubtful what can be achieved in reality during the very short 
term of the presidency. The Czechs are already struggling with many 
unexpected issues on the agenda. At the same time the relatively 
low legislative activity in the Eu and the outgoing Commission and 
Parliament might open a window of opportunity for the Presidency 
to focus on proper work in the Council and at least put some of these 
ideas on the table to be taken up by future presidencies. moreover, 
it is something that can contribute to bridging the confidence gap on 
the Turkish side showing that there are countries in the Eu willing 
to engage with Turkey seriously despite the lack of progress in the ac-
cession negotiations. Finally, such initiatives can build a bridge to the 
swedish Eu presidency that can take many of these thoughts further 
and consider whether they can be practically implemented. despite 
the lack of expectations, the Eu, the Czech presidency and Turkey 
should all be creative in envisaging ways of co-operating in the im-
mediate Eu neighbourhood. The worst that can happen to both par-
ties would be to lose interest and capacity to act together before full 
Turkish membership in the Eu is accomplished. 
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the eu’s experIment 
WIth CondItIonalIty 
and publIC opInIon 
makIng
PETEr BAlAzs 
And dEniz Bingol mCdonAld
Enlargement is often spoken of as the Eu’s most successful for-eign policy, and at the same time its most important challenge. Five years after its ‘big bang’ expansion, students of the Eu 
have been taking a tally of its successes and its failures. since its 
foundation with six members in 1958, each enlargement has altered 
the character as well as the composition of the union. With the en-
largement to include ten Eastern European candidates in may 2004 
the Eu became a union of 25, and two others were added in January 
of 2007. The real possibility of inclusion of two remaining countries, 
Turkey and Croatia, was raised at the European summit, december 
17th, 2004, while the Eu decided to open membership negotiations 
with Turkey on october 3, 2005. meanwhile icelandic politicians and 
Brussels are mulling over the prospect of an icelandic application for 
Eu membership. Croatia, given its candidate status since June 2004, 
has made significant progress in completing the necessary chapters, 
while macedonia, after becoming a candidate country in december 
of 2005, signed its Accession Partnership in 2008.
in the Eu-15 prior to the big bang enlargement there had been 
significant variation of public support for enlargement, and an even 
more significant variation of support for the admission of this or 
that candidate country. This chapter addresses this variation of pub-
lic support as well as discussing the major differences of perception 
of membership of the CEE-10 countries and the remaining three can-
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didates. it also aims to assess the lessons that can be learnt from the 
cases of the new members by Turkey and its Balkan neighbors.
a speCial Case?
The decision to open negotiations with Turkey had been preceded 
by earlier decisions by the helsinki European Council in 1999 to 
grant candidate status to Turkey. Turkey subsequently embarked on 
a wide-ranging reform process to meet the Eu political and econom-
ic criteria to qualify for negotiations.1 The 2005 European summit 
was preceded by a bitter debate in Europe on Turkey’s eligibility for 
membership and its ‘Europeanness’ among supranational and na-
tional elites as well as the European general public, divided as it was 
on the issue of Turkey. in the debate over Turkish Eu membership it 
is often asserted that Turkey is a special case. By examining opinions 
on Turkey alongside opinions on other potential Eu members, we 
hope to show how the Turkish case is evaluated both as a ‘sui gene-
ris’ case and also as part and parcel of the larger scheme of further 
enlargement of the Eu. Though Turkish accession prospects have 
parallels with those of earlier enlargement debates, we would argue 
that debates about the prospects of Turkish membership, along with 
that of several candidates and prospective candidates in the Western 
Balkans, differ with respect to earlier enlargement experience. These 
differences stem from what Eu conditionality actually managed to 
achieve in the CEE 10 and so far performed in the western Balkans 
and Turkey. 
Conditionality, as the European union’s enlargement tool, could 
be interpreted as one of the most successful tools of democratization. 
Conditionality involves the EU’s linking perceived benefits to anoth-
er state, such as financial assistance, trade concessions, cooperation 
agreements, political contacts and eventually membership, to the ful-
fillment of certain conditions. These normally relate to the protection 
of human and minority rights, the advancement of democratic princi-
ples and, in some cases, willingness to engage in regional cooperation. 
1 see kirisci, k. (2004) ‘Assessing the 16-17 december 2004 European 
Council decision on Turkey: is it a historic decision?’, tusiad.org.tr and 
onis, z. (2003). ‘domestic Politics, international norms and Challenges 
to the state: Turkey- Eu relations in the post- helsinki Era,’ in Turkey and 
the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International 
Dynamics, Albany, ny: suny Press. 
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Such conditionality is justified on the growing international con-
sensus (as witness recent opinion polls, media concern and unsC 
resolutions) that human rights are universal principles and that ex-
pressing concern about violations cannot be considered as interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of a state. Eu conditionality, coming as 
an outcome of many intergovernmental debates amongst the Eu 
member states, could be considered more acceptable than one state’s 
dictating conditions in exchange for aid. 
Conditionality, however, is not an easy instrument to use. There 
are no scientific rules covering democracy and there remain differ-
ent interpretations of human rights. Judging whether a state has 
met rather vague political criteria is bound to be highly subjective. 
in the application of conditionality the Eu has preferred positive to 
negative measures, imposing sanctions only as a last resort. Posi-
tive conditionality, though, is not always applied consistently. in 
december 1991 Croatia was recognized even though it had not met 
the conditions outlined by the Badinter Commission2, whilst rec-
ognition of macedonia was withheld even though it had met the 
conditions. In the field of development assistance there has been 
a steady decline in assistance to those states such as kenya, malawi, 
sudan, Togo and zaire, which have violated human rights); and an 
increase to those such as south Africa, Burkina Faso and zambia 
showing positive trends. 
summing up Eu conditionality’s performance with respect to the 
2004-7 enlargements and looking towards possible future enlarge-
ments, one main question arises: do the ‘carrots’ go beyond acces-
sion?’ This is an especially valid question given public support for 
ongoing reforms. in both of the latest enlargement cases, long transi-
tional periods were set in e.g. free movement of labor, and safeguard 
clauses inserted at the last minute, which makes observers more ap-
prehensive about a future multi-tier Eu; the subsequent budget re-
negotiations in the case of Poland, and with the CAP and structural 
funds in the case of romania, were only some of the developments 
we have experienced with respect to the two waves of enlargement 
not foreseen by the Commission at the start.
2 The Badinter Arbitration Commission, consisting of presidents of Con-
stitutional courts in the ECC, was established to provide international le-
gal advice and opinions on the post-secession international borders in-
volving the breakaway republics of yugoslavia. 
66
Conditionality mechanisms were thought to create or feed into 
mechanisms that would help aspirant countries fulfill the condi-
tions for membership. Firstly, conditionality was thought to promote 
healthy competition amongst the countries lined up to join in a re-
gion. Secondly, throughout the process of fulfilling conditions for 
membership, they were expected to initiate regional cooperation in 
order to share policy know-how. moreover, a group of countries in 
a region with converging policy goals could act in unison in their 
negotiations with Brussels. A substantial example emerged in the 
cooperation of the visegrad Four (slovakia, hungary, Poland and the 
Czech republic), which arguably helped to negotiate conditions of 
entry wholesale with Brussels. Another mechanism that condition-
ality was thought to nurture was how one country could learn by 
example from another country, perhaps one more in a front-runner 
position. The front runner country’s policy processes and formulas 
could teach the less experienced or laggard country how it could be 
done. last but not least, sticks and carrots of conditionality were 
thought to coax different political actors towards a consensus on po-
litical and economic reforms necessary to graduate to the next stage 
of accession. 
The past record of conditionality could be compared with the dy-
namics regarding the ongoing processes of enlargement to include 
the Western Balkans and Turkey. such a brief exercise of taking 
stock of past experience could highlight what lessons can be learnt 
and what can be done differently in the next possible round(s) of 
enlargement. 
The significant differences in perceptions and in public opinion 
on the accession of the CEE and Western Balkans in Western Euro-
pean members of the union show that while the adherence to condi-
tions and the efforts made by the aspirants in CEE were considered 
in a very positive light, the Western Balkan countries are perceived 
as less likely to catch up, except for Croatia, which has been sup-
ported both at the political elite level and by wide public opinion in 
old member states such as germany and Austria and new ones such 
as slovenia and slovakia, as well as in hungary. Paying more atten-
tion to public opinion about policies concerning further widening 
(as was the case at the nice summit) and deepening (as the two noes 
on the Eu constitution showed) was seen as a way to deal with the 
often highlighted problem of democratic deficit, endemic in the EU 
institutional set-up. Public opinion about the accession of Turkey in 
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particular is something Eu policy makers as well as national politi-
cians have managed to bring to the fore, perhaps from a desire not to 
repeat the mistakes of the two enlargement waves. 
Credibility gap
The main pitfalls of conditionality come to light as the Eu contin-
ues to deal with the prospect of Turkish membership, a large state, 
situated as it is on the fringes of Europe, with an overwhelmingly 
muslim population and socioeconomic conditions below the Eu av-
erage. in this often-heated debate many arguments can be raised. 
Some reflect genuine problems, while others are of a more emotion-
al nature3 The European union keeps negotiations open-ended, for 
reasons that could be summarized as credibility gap and difficulties 
surrounding absorption capacity, but we would argue that these are 
in no way particular to the Turkish case. The lack of finalité and the 
3 The TEPAV- collection of viewpoints from specific members for Turkish 
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credibility gap have repeatedly been raised both by aspirant country 
elites in the Western Balkans and the Commission respectively. 
While the momentum of accession reforms was lost after 2006 in 
Turkey, both the Turkish and the EU sides lament the deficit of commit-
ment to the process of passing legislation and implementing reforms 
that have been passed by the Turkish parliament in the last six years. 
several other critics of the Eu’s shortcomings in integrating Turkey em-
phasize that with Turkey the Eu keeps falling into its own rhetorical 
trap. schimmelfennig4 explains “rhetorical trap” as a situation in which 
the Eu cannot avoid including the Central and Eastern European mem-
bers in its declared commitment to the democratization of these states. 
it could be argued that the Eu fell into a rhetorical trap, in reverse, once 
it admitted the republic of Cyprus despite its unresolved problems with 
Turkey and that now the Eu does not have enough room to maneuver. 
The conflicts between Turkey and new EU member Cyprus led to the 
suspension of eight critical chapters of acquis, resulting from Turkey’s 
refusal to open its air and sea ports to Cyprus.
The above mentioned credibility gap also turned into a decline in 
support for EU membership in Turkey in the past three years, reflect-
ed by the lack of progress on the Eu side. The negative decision by 
the European Council summit that year will have been considered as 
confirming Turkey’s deeply rooted perception of rejection by Europe, 
with less-than-perfect compliance with membership criteria serving as 
an excuse for the real reason: religious and cultural differences. The 
erosion of public support and the likely emergence of a more visible 
opposition to Eu membership could decisively weaken the Erdogan 
government and bring the transformational process to a more definite 
halt, as indicated in the report of the independent Commission on 
Turkey (composed of public officials in Europe that have held high 
public office, with professed commitment to European integration).5 
Another pitfall of conditionality with respect to Turkish accession 
could be described as the ‘politicization’ of political conditionality. 
The objective political conditions demanded compliance in areas 
that could be regarded as political dynamite, especially in the areas 
of freedom of expression, association, and minority rights. it may be 
4 schimmelfennig, F. (2001) ‘The Community Trap: liberal norms, rheto-
rical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European union’. inter-
national organisation, 55:1, 47-80.
5 report of the independent Commission on Turkey 2005, available at, 
http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/newsroom.html. 
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argued that these reforms in line with Eu accession conditions have 
led to a change in the balance of power between staunch protectors 
of the centralist-unitarian kemalist state and the more libertarian and 
moderately islamist ruling Ak party. similar changes in the balance 
of power between reformers and preservers of the status quo oc-
curred in former enlargement cases, but there is something funda-
mentally different in this third wave. 
The Eu faces its own uncertain future with the Constitutional 
Treaty in the coming decade, as confirmed by the referenda and the 
unfavorable opinions about institutional deepening in Eurobarom-
eter polls. Thus the Eu cannot offer Turkey and other problematic 
potential candidates in its neighborhood any concrete deadlines for 
absorbing them, unlike its uncompromising position on the neces-
sity of a ‘return to Europe’ for the CEE candidates in the previous 
two waves. The Eu’s interpretation of its normative goals and its 
political conditions remain ‘hostage’ to its now 27 members’ chang-
ing goals and interests on the one hand, and on the other hand, to 
the ever-changing geo-political and economic developments in the 
region, very much due to Russia’s new exercise of influence in its 
immediate vicinity.
pUbliC perCeption of fUrther enlargement: a view from 
eUropean Union eUrobarometers
As stated above, Brussels policy makers and national politicians 
started to pay more attention to how the ‘European demos’ perceives 
further enlargement in the mid 90s. The attention to public opin-
ion polls on Eu level was raised to a new level with the discussion 
of democratic deficit in the formulation of the EU Constitutional 
Treaty. The Eurobarometer poll (including 25 countries) released in 
may 2006 suggested that despite the misgivings about enlargement 
and the constitution, European union citizens interviewed from Feb-
ruary to march 2006 remained positive about further integration, 
though many were worried about the impact of enlargement, along 
with increasing globalization, on domestic labor markets.6 
majorities in 21 countries agreed that enlargement was positive on 
the whole and majorities in all 25 member states wanted to see more 




decision-making at Eu level across a variety of issues. on average 
more than half of Eu citizens (55 %) see enlargement as positive, but 
those in new member states are more optimistic about the benefits 
of admitting more countries (69 %), than those in older ones (53 %). 
The five countries where respondents were most likely to agree that 
‘overall, the enlargement of the Eu is something positive’ had all 
joined the Eu the previous spring: slovenia (76%), Poland (73%), Cy-
prus (71%), Lithuania (69%), and Slovakia (68%). A significant differ-
ence emerged with the Eu countries that joined the bloc more than 
a decade ago; the five least enthusiastic countries joined the bloc 
a decade or more ago, Austria (40%), France (42%), Finland (45%), 
luxembourg (48%), and the uk (49%). 
People in most member states believe that ‘further European 
Union enlargement improves the influence of the EU in the world.’ 
But although majorities in 23 countries agreed, there was skepticism 
in the two older members, Austria, where only 43 percent agreed (49% 
disagreed), and France, where 50 percent agreed (40% disagreed). The 
conviction that the EU gave Europeans more international influence 
was strongest among new members: more than 7 out of 10 in Cyprus 
(80%), slovenia (79%), Poland (76%), the Czech republic (73%) and 
slovakia (71%). The only older member states to express similar lev-
els of conviction were Belgium (74%) and greece (72%). 
on major debates and issues, Europeans seemed ready to see 
Brussels take on more responsibility. The conviction was strongest 
however in issues that concern the enlargement prospects of the Eu, 
such as security, the fight against terrorism, the promotion of de-
mocracy and peace in the world, and organized crime. on average 80 
percent wanted more EU involvement in the fight against terror (12% 
less), 77 percent wanted the Eu to play a larger international role 
promoting democracy and peace (12% less) and 75 percent wanted 
the Eu to do more to combat organized crime (16% less). The desire 
for greater Eu involvement was somewhat weaker on economic and 
social issues, such as the fight against unemployment, the protection 
of social rights, the protection of agriculture, and ensuring economic 
growth.
Public opinion polls also testify to the divergences in Eu de-
bates leading to the Eu big bang enlargement and those regarding 
prospective enlargement to include the Western Balkans and Tur-
key. This next section will deal with public perceptions about the 
future accession of Turkey and the Western Balkans and then we 
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will look at the special position of Austria and whether it could be 
considered the ‘deal breaker’ with respect to the three current can-
didates. Austria along with germany has had a special role in the 
CEE-10 accession. Austria continues to make or break the case for 
acceding to its hinterland in the western Balkans and extending its 
civilizational posture towards Turkey, which it has defended more 
strongly since post WWii in connection with reformulating its na-
tional identity and its policy of ‘neutrality’.7 is Austria a barometer 
or a bellwether for the Eu’s willingness to engage in the next stage 
of enlargement?
a fUtUre re-shaping of the debate and potential problems 
for the w. balkans and tUrkey
The perception of Turkish membership should be considered 
in the broader context of an analysis of opinions toward a possible 
geographical range of potential members, including russia, ukraine, 
Caucasus and the Black sea. A perusal of the European news media 
and op-eds in main European journals reflects both existential ques-
tions such as ‘Who are the Europeans?” and ”Where does Europe 
begin and end?” The proponents of enlargement in general argue 
that the inclusion of these Central and Eastern countries would ben-
efit European economies by providing new markets while stabilizing 
emerging democracies in the east of the continent. opponents how-
ever, argue that enlargement would have adverse effects on employ-
ment by providing the Eastern European workforce rights of mobility 
to work in European countries, and to benefit from generous social 
welfare benefits. The contemplation of Turkish membership raises 
considerations of the practical benefits and costs of Turkey’s mem-
bership to the European economies and the political and security 
structure emerging in Europe, as well as existential questions about 
the “Europeanness” of Turkey. 
The limited literature on mass public opinion in the current 
member states may reflect the limited role citizens of the member 
states have in the process of Eu enlargement that we discussed in 
the previous sections of this contribution. unlike treaty revisions, 
which frequently give rise to popular referendums, accession is 
7 Pelinka, A. and Wodak, r. (2002) The haider Phenomenon in Austria. 
new Brunswick: Transaction. 
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rarely the subject of a referendum in any of the existing member 
states (with the notable exception of the French referendum on uk 
membership.) The literature on attitudes of current Eu members 
to enlargement has been limited to assessment of elite level opin-
ions about enlargement. The discrepancy between opinion about 
enlargement on the elite level and on the level of the public at large 
may be a result of a democratic deficit and, mainly, of the informa-
tional asymmetry between elites and public about the future of the 
EU. Students of European integration repeatedly find that ‘support 
for a European political federation emerged much earlier, and was 
more widespread among elite groups than mass public.’8 Europe 
remains an ‘elite project, especially so in the less developed coun-
tries’.9 The opinion of the public at large about enlargement is too 
little studied, even though the enlargement process has economic 
and political repercussions in the daily lives of the citizens of the 
current members. 
stephen Wood, a political scientist specializing on public opinion 
in germany, drew a line between public and elite support for en-
largement, arguing that the Eastern Enlargement that was to include 
the countries of the CEE (ost-Erweiterung) had largely been an elite 
enterprise in germany. german politicians after 1990 have, except 
for a few dissidents, envisaged no alternatives to an eastward widen-
ing of the Eu, while the german public had provided no positive 
endorsement of its own. in early 1996, only 11 percent of the german 
public favoured the addition of new members as an option for the 
immediate future of the Eu. According to the 1997 Eurobarometer, 
just before Agenda 2000, 29 percent of germans were in favor of 
eastern enlargement and 46 percent were opposed. 
Aside from the more commonplace socio-economic arguments 
by Eu member states against Turkish membership to the Eu , one 
country’s opposition stands out from others. Austria has physical 
borders with nearly all past and present candidates. With respect 
to Turkey, Austria is amongst the countries with a substantial Turk-
ish minority. Just as with germany, Belgium, the netherlands and 
France, Turkish membership is seen through the prism of the expe-
8 Wessels, W. (1996). , The modern West- European state and the Euro-
pean union: democratic Erosion or a new kind of Polity,’ in s. s. Ander-
sen and k. Eliassen (eds.) The European union: how democratic is it?. 
london: sage Publications. 
9 kohli, m. (2000) ‘The Battlegrounds of European identity’. European 
societies. 2:2. 113-37.
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rience of Turkish immigrants who often find it hard to integrate into 
the societies of host countries. An interesting comparison could be 
made between Austria’s support for the accession of Western Bal-
kan candidates, principally that of Croatia, and its clear opposition 
to Turkey. 
the CUltUral-ideational dimension of aUstria’s skeptiCism 
aboUt tUrkey
The main factors determining negative attitudes towards Turkey’s 
membership of the Eu are phrases such as ‘cultural differences’, in-
cluding the historical past of the ottoman empire in relation to the 
habsburg imperial domain. The size of the country’s population 
and the fear of a new flood of immigrants are accompanying factors. 
More prosaically, there is little inclination to accept additional finan-
cial burdens in order to bring Turkey’s economy up to European 
standards. 
Thus, public opinion in Austria concerning Turkish and Croatian 
membership offers special insights. on the heels of the Thessaloniki 
Summit of 2003, confirming the accession prospects of Western Bal-
kan countries including Croatia, the next major turning point came 
when Turkey and Croatia’s destinies were to be decided in the Euro-
pean Council summit of June 2004. Austria, holding the presidency 
of the Council weighed in with its unfavorable opinion of the for-
mer, indicating its preference for enlarging into the Western Balkans. 
The time period leading to the Austrian elections highlighted some 
of the major themes that arose with respect to Turkish accession. 
These themes converge on two main planes, namely, the civilization-
al/cultural and politico-economic planes. Fears of Turkish accession 
were often instrumentalized to gather support for Eu-skeptic parties 
(verging on the xenophobic) in the run-up to the Austrian elections, 
as was evident in the electoral campaigns of the Freedom Party and 
its counterparts in germany and during the Presidential elections in 
France (ending in the election of the candidate that indicated his clear 
opposition to Turkish membership during his campaign speeches, 
nicolas sarkozy). not long ago before this was written, Austria de-
cided to put admission of Turkey to a public vote if the union agreed 
to accept the Turkish republic’s bid. ‘Coalition parties have agreed 
to go for a referendum if Turkey’s accession talks are concluded in 
favor of a decision to prepare a membership agreement’ Austria’s 
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Foreign minister ursula Plassnik told newspapers in August 2008. 
she added that Turkey’s membership would add a new dimension 
to Eu integration and the Eu. The chances for the public vote to be 
against Turkey’s membership in the event of a referendum continue 
to be high. 
Public opinion polls in Austria show the disapproval rating to be 
as high as 80%, making Austria the most skeptical member. The new 
government decided to keep the referendum pledge after its elec-
tion in september 2008. The reception in Brussels circles was that 
it was largely an Austrian election ploy, but it does not diverge from 
Austria’s disproportionate skepticism about Turkish membership, 
and Austria’s preference for giving membership to certain western 
Balkans before Turkey. This could be regarded as an ideational is-
sue for Austria with respect to her relations to Europe, and also as 
an extension of the reformulation of her strategic position during 
and after the Cold war between Western Europe and communist 
Central and Eastern Europe. The Central European initiative (CEi) 
and the Danube Cooperation were two significant manifestation of 
this special position that Austria held vis-à-vis the admission of the 
CEE-10. 
on the eve of June 5, 2005 Austria at the last moment withdrew 
its demand that Turkey should be offered an option short of full 
membership and, by giving the go ahead to Croatia, Austria’s last 
objections to negotiations with Turkey were removed. The Austrian 
foreign minister justified this opposition by saying that ‘her coun-
try was listening to the people’ by questioning full membership for 
Turkey. so why was Austria especially sensitive to the ‘people’s mis-
givings’ towards Turkey’s accession? looking at the public opinion 
figures, we can establish a trend against Turkish accession but in 
favor of accession prospects of most other countries on the waiting 
list. mr. schuessel, the Chancellor of Austria contributed to the 
debate by arguing that there were double standards about the Turk-
ish republic’s and Croatia’s membership, that ‘everyone shut their 
eyes on the human rights issue in Turkey while Croatia was to be 
refused the start of negotiations because a single general – one who 
was not even in Croatia – had not yet been yet delivered up to the 
hague Tribunal.’10 




The Brussels summit in itself foreshadowed the Austrian Presi-
dency’s Balkan priority. The Austrian Eu Presidency has supported 
Balkan countries, both on the Enlargement and European foreign 
policy front. The text prepared by the Austrian Foreign ministry on 
the 2006 Austrian Eu Presidency says that “in June 2005, the Euro-
pean Council reaffirmed that all the Balkan States have a “European 
Perspective” and thus the possibility to accede to the Eu, provided 
they satisfy the conditions for membership. Austria has always sup-
ported this policy. We are convinced that the future of all the coun-
tries in the Western Balkans lies within the European union” (Eu 
Council 2005). 
Concerning the Enlargement debate, the text that the European 
Council published underlines that the decision on whether or not ac-
cession negotiations would start with macedonia might be taken un-
der the Austrian presidency in 2006. on Turkey and Croatia, it was 
stated that the first reports on the screening process would be pre-
sented during the Austrian presidency, and later it was announced 
that Austria would also start the negotiation of the initially envisaged 
relatively easy chapters such as science and Technology with Tur-
key. The Council of ministers would then decide by unanimous vote 
whether or not individual negotiating chapters would be opened. de-
spite a small crisis during this period that step was taken. As for ro-
mania and Bulgaria, the text underlines that the Commission might 
recommend that the entry be deferred for one year, should it decide 
that the countries do not fulfil the conditions for EU accession on 1 
January, 2007.
As a further thought on the future of enlargement, the Council 
presidencies of the new member states, starting with the Czech re-
public in the first half of 2009, would be a special case for the utiliza-
tion of this most successful democratization tool and its perception 
by the European population at large. The Eu of 27 could be expected 
to have a more pragmatic approach to future membership prospects 
when it comes to extending the strategic position of the Eu in its 
immediate neighborhood. Possibly one of the biggest lesson learnt 
from the past enlargement experience by the countries of Central 
and Eastern may be the emphasis on such pragmatism and the dan-
gers of politicization of conditions.
once old candidates turn into new members different dynamics 
will be added to the already complex issue of using Eu sticks and 
carrots to democratize the European neighborhood, and to incor-
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porate reliable partners and future members. The switch from the 
position of supplicant to new positions of power for the new mem-
bers could be an ideal test case with respect to the new shape the Eu 
would take. The new countries’ publics could be more empathetic 
to adjusting the conditionality mechanisms that may not work to 
the desired degree for candidates, and perhaps these new members 
have sympathy with the struggles and different dynamics and ex-
pectations co-existing within the aspirants to the Eu in the Western 
Balkans and Turkey. 
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Challenges 2009:  
eu-turkey relatIons 
on the road to…? 
CEREN zEYNEP AK , MENSUR AKGÜN, 
sylviA TiryAki
it is acknowledged by all parties at this time that Eu-Turkey re-lations have reached a low point, the Turkish side questioning whether the Eu will keep its promises and the Eu struggling with 
an internal consolidation in relation to Turkey’s membership and 
asking whether they should trust Turkey with regard to its commit-
ment to the negotiation process. The challenges in Eu-Turkey rela-
tions should be considered as a twofold concept. Although every 
problem that will be pointed out in this section seems to be a chal-
lenge for the Turkish side, the internal debates these issues create 
within the European union itself also constitute a challenge that 
needs to be examined. 
When, therefore, it comes to the enlargement debate in the Eu, the 
Turkish question is not only a question of another country’s member-
ship but also has become the “ultimate test for the Eu” and, as some 
claim, has brought to light a dilemma inherent in the Eu itself:1 how to 
find the right balance between a European identity that encompasses 
the diversity of the union and the ability of the union to act unani-
mously as a global actor with regard to foreign policy issues. The idea 
of the Eu acting as a global player has produced challenges for the 
union itself, if we consider the divergence on certain foreign policy 
issues even among the member states themselves.2
1 yotov, stilian y. “Turkey and the Eu: The ultimate Challenge”. Critique 
& Humanism, vol 27: February 2008. pp. 7.
2 see further luif, Paul. “Eu cohesion in the un general Assembly”, Pa-
ris: European union institute for security studies, december 2003.
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tUrkey’s different levels of progress
The current situation in the Turkish accession talks is clearly indicat-
ed in the progress reports prepared by the European Commission. The 
recent report that was published in November 2008 outlines the diffi-
culties Turkey faces and the progress that was achieved in certain prob-
lem areas compared with those that still pose a serious challenge to Eu 
member states where Turkish membership is concerned.3 so far, eight 
chapters have been opened in the accession negotiations. With regard 
to the relations between the Eu and Turkey, the report states that en-
hanced political dialogue continued in the year 2008, including regular 
discussions of foreign policy issues related to regional areas of common 
interest such as iraq, iran, the middle East and the Caucasus. Financial 
relations, i.e. the Customs union agreement, further contributed to an 
increase in bilateral trade. however, the december 2006 Council deci-
sion4 is still in force and hampers Turkey’s commitment to continue the 
accession process and the implementation of certain reforms. 
The first matter set out in the report relates to political criteria. 
With regard to the criteria democracy and the rule of law, the con-
stitutional court applications to dissolve the AkP, the governing 
party, for alleged anti-secular activities and the democratic society 
Party5 (dTP) for allegedly engaging in activities against the unity and 
integrity of the country, had a negative impact on the smooth func-
tioning of the newly elected parliament. The AkP case resulted in 
an order to cut off 50% of the government funds that were supposed 
to be allocated to AkP and the dTP case is still pending before the 
Constitutional Court.6 The preparation of a civic constitution is also 
3 see http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/
reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf
4 The december 2006 Council decision declares that negotiations will not 
be opened on eight chapters relevant to Turkey’s restrictions regarding 
the republic of Cyprus and that for the time being no chapter will be 
closed until the Commission confirms that Turkey has fully implemen-
ted the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement. For further 
details see Com(2008)674.
5 A closure case against the dTP is still pending at the Constitutional Court 
with the indictment that speeches and actions by party leaders have pro-
ved that the party has become a focal point of activities against the sove-
reignty of the state and the indivisible unity of the country and the nation.





mentioned in the report, praising the efforts of the current govern-
ment to bring academics together to revise the 1982 Constitution 
with the aim to align Turkey with international standards on funda-
mental rights. 
however, the point of criticism still holds, for the government has 
not publicized the draft of the new constitution nor has it prepared 
a clear timetable for its discussion. one of the positive developments 
has been the amendment to the law on elections and electoral rolls 
that extended the right of Turkish citizens living abroad to partici-
pate in parliamentary elections. At several points in the report, the 
AkP government is commended for its expression of commitment to 
the Eu accession process and to political reforms. however, the cur-
rent government is also harshly criticized for not keeping its promise 
to implement a consistent and comprehensive program of political 
reforms despite its strong political mandate. 
one of the issues that raise concerns about the democratization 
process in Turkey is the jurisdiction of the military forces and civil-
ian oversight of security forces. it is stressed in the report that no 
progress has been made on civilian supervision of military forces 
and defense expenditure. on another note about Turkey’s democra-
tization efforts, the report portrays the draft judicial reform strategy 
as a positive development; however the continuation of the reform 
process and the consultation with all stakeholders is strongly encour-
aged. moreover, it is stated that concerns about the impartiality and 
independence of the judiciary still remain valid. 
With regard to human rights criteria and the protection of minori-
ties, it is claimed that Turkey has successfully implemented a num-
ber of ECthr judgments. yet it has been noted that further efforts 
are definitely needed in this context and that the institutions neces-
sary for the promotion and enforcement of human rights lack inde-
pendence and resources. moreover, it is stated that there have been 
limited efforts to prevent torture and ill-treatment; the allegations of 
torture and ill-treatment during detention and outside official places 
of detention need to be addressed. in addition, although good prog-
ress has been made on improving infrastructure and on training of 
staff in detention centers, shortcomings related to the restrictions on 
prisoners’ conditions, on solitary confinement and on occasional ill-
treatment remain causes for concern. 
it is further noted in the section pertaining to human rights that 
the efforts to strengthen safeguards for freedom of speech together 
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with the amendment to Article 301 were highly welcomed and the 
implementation of the revised article is further encouraged together 
with more reforms to ensure full respect for freedom of expression 
both in law and in practice. Although the legal framework on free-
dom of association was substantially improved, disproportionate 
administrative difficulties and judicial proceedings are still present. 
however, it is stressed that there has been real progress on certain 
key problem areas, especially with the adoption of the law on Foun-
dations. 
yet it is also claimed that the implementation of the law on 
property-related issues concerning non-muslim minorities remains 
a challenge. it is advised by the Commission that Turkey make fur-
ther efforts to carry out initiatives that will create an environment 
conducive to full respect for freedom of religion. 
in continuation of the section related to human rights, it says 
that the legal framework guaranteeing women’s rights and gender 
equality has been successfully adopted, however, further efforts with 
regard to reducing the gap between men and women are urgently 
needed. Finally regarding the protection of minorities and cultural 
rights the report clearly states that Turkey has to step up reforms 
and promote respect for cultural diversity. it is stressed that certain 
restrictions still continue and reforms have to speed up immediately. 
When the report comes to foreign policy as one of its final issues, 
it acknowledges Turkey’s efforts to maintain regional stability and to 
take up the role of mediator in certain regional conflicts. It is, more-
over, stated that Turkey has achieved broad alignment with common 
foreign and security policy statements and declarations of the Eu 
while improving bilateral diplomatic relations with its neighbors, in-
cluding Armenia. It is indicated that Turkey’s intensified diplomatic 
exchanges are perceived as crucial by the Eu, especially in the com-
mon foreign policy and security areas of interest to both parties. in 
conclusion it is stressed that Turkey is contributing substantially to 
EsdP and enhancing its positive role of regional stabilization, par-
ticularly in the Caucasus and the middle East. 
overall, Turkey has shown different levels of progress in the prob-
lem areas that are of importance to the continuation of the accession 
process. Although there are still some restrictions in the implemen-
tation of the reforms that have been adopted and further efforts are 
necessary in most of the problem areas, Turkish officials continue to 
express their commitment to the accession talks. moreover, although 
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it may be the case that public support for accession has decreased on 
both sides, in Turkey and in Eu member states, the aspiration to Eu 
membership cannot be said to have disappeared. For both sides it 
may be openly claimed that there is still support.
in comparison to previous progress reports, the 2008 report per-
haps portrays the problems related to the Eu accession process with 
a more balanced approach. issues such as minority rights or the draft-
ing of the new constitution are evaluated in a more analytical way 
and include certain suggestions. While noting the commendations of 
Turkey’s attitude towards the conflicts in the region the report, how-
ever, fails to mention the union’s acceptance of its responsibilities 
that would complement Turkey’s efforts in issues such as Cyprus. 
moreover the report lacks constructive proposals that would help to 
overcome the current stagnation in the Eu process. Although the re-
port contains a somewhat positive perspective on issues such as for-
eign policy when compared with previous years and acknowledges 
Turkey’s importance in certain areas like transportation of energy, it 
still does not touch on some of issues of real importance to the con-
tinuation of the negotiation process.7 This aspect of the report makes 
it especially difficult to overcome the perception in the Turkish press 
and civil society that the Commission is biased against Turkey.
too many obstaCles
Although the public support on both sides seems to be decreas-
ing, it should be noted that public opinion is not as low as it was in 
2004 and the numbers also show that there is an increasing trend 
towards supporting Turkish membership. As a result, it is crucial 
that the Turkish government continues the reform process while Eu 
member states prepare their own public opinion about Turkish mem-
bership, as the challenges stand in the way of both parties. it should 
also be noted by both stakeholders that the problems that seem to 
stand in the way are affecting both sides and therefore should be 
overcome by mutual cooperation. 
The greatest problem that stands in the way of Turkish politicians 
who support the accession process is undoubtedly the backlash in 
public opinion and the loss of trust in the Eu. The general belief 
in Turkish public opinion is that there is to be an endless wait for 
7 see further http://www.euractiv.com.tr/ab-ve-turkiye/article/ikvden-
2008-ilerleme-raporu-hakkinda-gorus.
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Turkey to enter the European union. According to a recent survey 
published by the international republican institute (iri), trust in the 
European union in Turkey is, on a scale of 1 to 4, around 1.99, which 
may be seen as proving claims that the Eu image in Turkish public 
opinion suffers significantly from the idea that it is useless to adopt 
the reforms required by the Eu since Europeans do not want Turkey 
inside the union anyway8. nor do leaders in Europe help improve 
this setback to the Eu image either. The main source of this dividing 
line between Eu member states and Turkey seems to be the cultural 
argument, i.e. religion. These factors giving force to the backlash in 
Turkish public opinion – including the open-endedness of the acces-
sion negotiations and the stream of statements from Turko-skeptic 
leaders of European union member states, e. g. Angela merkel and 
nicolas sarkozy – also strengthen the general public perception that 
the Eu is a “Christian club”. moreover, sarkozy’s pledge to hold 
a referendum on Turkey’s accession and the idea of “privileged part-
nership” has fed into the skepticism about the Eu. 
still, the most important factor that has led to the current stagna-
tion in the accession process is the Cyprus problem. As one may re-
member, right after the rejection of the Annan Plan by the greek Cy-
priots it was officially declared by European leaders that the result of 
the referenda and the attitude of the then greek Cypriot government 
was a total disappointment for the Eu. Promises had been given to 
overcome the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. yet, to this 
date the isolationist policies towards the Turkish Cypriots still con-
tinue although there is no clear legally binding argument that lifting 
the isolation would amount to recognition of the TrnC.9 since 2004, 
only the green line regulation has been realized; it did not however 
help to end the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. more-
over, the Financial Aid regulation has not been fully implemented, 
which has also further aggravated the situation on the Turkish side 
8 Williams and Associates, “survey of Turkish Public opinion, march 29 – 
April 14 2008”, international republican institute, 21.07.2008. see further 
http://209.85.129.132/search?q=cache:lh4kirssfQgJ:www.iri.org/europe 
/ turkey /pdf s /20 0 8%2520Ju ly%252021%2520survey%2520o -
f%2520Turkish%2520Public%2520opinion,%2520march%252029-A-
pr i l%252014,%252020 0 8.pdf+Turkish+Publ ic+opinion+sur-
veys+2008&hl=tr&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=tr. 
9 Akgün, mensur et al. “A Promise to keep: Time to End the international 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots”. TEsEv Publications, istanbul. June 
2008.
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of the island. [one of the founding principles of the Eu had been not 
to import conflict into the Union.]
As has been stated elsewhere, republic of Cyprus (roC) admis-
sion to the Eu without settlement of the Cyprus problem compli-
cated Turkey’s accession process too10. Fearing domestic reactions to 
the allegations of recognition of the greek Cypriot administration’s 
jurisdiction over the entire territory of the 1960 Cyprus republic, the 
Turkish government extended the scope of the Customs union ter-
ritory first to 9 member countries and later to 10, but abstained from 
using the constitutional name of the roC. After protracted negotia-
tions, a protocol extending the Custom union to the 10 new member 
states was signed by Turkey and the Commission on 29 July 2004. 
Turkey attached a six-point declaration on non-recognition of the 
roC’s jurisdiction over the territory controlled by the Turkish Cypri-
ots. in the meantime, the issue was further politicized and went be-
yond concerns over recognition. Turkey linked opening of its ports 
and airports to RoC flagged vessels to lifting the isolation imposed 
on the Turkish Cypriots. 
many in Turkey seem to believe that complying with the Customs 
union requirements amounts to unrestricted opening of ports and 
airports to RoC flagged craft. This may not only entail recognition 
but will also mean financial subsidy for the Greek side of the island 
as their ships would be carrying cargo to and from Turkish ports 
while the Turkish Cypriots were suffering from the consequences of 
political and economic isolation. 
moreover, the serious reaction from Turkey has also made the 
current state of affairs look like a political choice. As we stated else-
where, the Turkish Cypriots are not able to take part in certain foot-
ball matches that are organized by FiFA. having seen this and been 
influenced by the proto-nationalist opposition both in and out of the 
Parliament, Prime Minister Erdoğan established a political connec-
tion between the lifting of the isolation and the opening of ports and 
airports to vessels flying under RoC flag, as this was continually de-
manded and desired by the greek Cypriot leadership then in power. 
As the situation worsened in the new state of affairs, the problem of 
isolation started to be perceived as a political choice. 
10 see further mensur Akgün et al. “A Promise to keep: Time to End the 
international isolation of the Turkish Cypriots”. TEsEv Publications, is-
tanbul. June 2008. 
84
on the other side of the coin, as Eurobarometer surveys show, 
there has been a visible decrease in support for Turkish member-
ship in Eu member states, especially France, germany and Austria11. 
in addition to this, Eurobarometer surveys of december 2005 and 
may 2006 conducted in different Eu member countries showed that, 
although France is leading, it is not the only country where there 
is strong opposition to Turkey’s membership12. in germany, where 
there is a large Turkish community, the support for Turkish acces-
sion is relatively lower than might be expected for a country with 
such a high population of Turkish descent. The reason for this low 
support is put down to the relatively traditional appearance and at-
titudes displayed by Turks living in Europe.13 in Austria, where sur-
veys again show very high numbers when skepticism about Turkey 
is at issue, the unsuccessful integration of Turkish immigrants paints 
a pessimistic picture, since the two biggest political parties conduct 
anti-Turkey campaigns and the media takes an anti-Turkey stance.14 
Furthermore, like France, the Austrian government has promised 
to hold a referendum when the accession treaty is signed. As is evi-
dent from all this, the increasing opposition to Turkish membership 
is considered by public opinion in Turkey not so much as a chal-
lenge as a hypocrisy, indecency and unwillingness to accept Turkey 
as a full-fledged member. 
perCeptions based on sCant information
Another challenge in Turkey-Eu relations that is widely discussed 
and seems to involve many attendant problems is the lack of infor-
mation in Eu member countries about Turkey and Turkish member-
ship. Turkey is perceived by the public in Eu member states only 
through the eyes of the media or the political elites. in many coun-
11 see further Eurobarometer ‘standard Eurobarometer’, december 2005 
and ‘The Future of Europe’, special survey, may 2006 and http://www.
euractiv.com/en/opinion/turkey-eu-public-thinks/article-171187.
12 see further Eurobarometer ‘standard Eurobarometer’, december 2005 
and ‘The Future of Europe’, special survey, may 2006 and http://www.
euractiv.com/en/opinion/turkey-eu-public-thinks/article-171187.
13 Kirişçi, Kemal and Refik Erzan, “Turkish Immigrants: Their Integration 
within the Eu and migration to Turkey”, Employment and Immigration Issu-
es in Turkish-EU relations. European Stability Initiative Briefing. 
14 see further Eurobarometer ‘standard Eurobarometer’, december 2005 
and ‘The Future of Europe’, special survey, may 2006 and http://www.
taurillon.org/Austria-and-the-Turkish-referendum.
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tries the stream of consciousness is not positive or pro-Turkey. What 
is more, the Turkish question is frequently used by Eu leaders dur-
ing election campaigns for domestic political purposes.15 The eco-
nomic, demographic and strategic benefits of Turkish membership, 
whether it be its younger population, or bigger market, or energy 
transportation hubs, or security in its neighborhood, are not clearly 
communicated to Eu public opinion molders. 
in fact, one of the most outspoken criticisms is that Eu citizens 
do not know about Turkey and they will be the ones to vote in the 
referenda whenever and wherever they are held. it is frequently ar-
gued that one of the fears that are endemic in Eu member states is 
the possibility of a mass migration from Turkey after a full accession. 
however, it was clearly stated in a study by Ayhan kaya that contrary 
to expectations, the Turkish immigrants living in Europe would tend 
to come back to Turkey once full membership is achieved and, al-
though there will be free movement, the number of people expected 
to migrate is less than the general trend of migration numbers at 
present.16 
moreover, it is argued that a strong Turkish economy may be 
a boost to the Eu economies, especially considering the recent state-
ments by Eu-4 that the union is going through a serious recession. 
According to surveys, the issue that attracts most attention from the 
Eu public about Turkish membership is the issue of security. more 
than 50% of Europeans believe that an Eu with Turkey has more 
chance to promote peace in the middle East and to help maintain sta-
bility in the Eu’s neighborhood17. The benefits of Turkish accession, 
whether it be demographics, that is, providing a younger population, 
or economic, the Turkish economy’s providing a boost to the reces-
sion in European markets, or security-related, Turkey’s playing a role 
in promoting peace and stability in the middle East and Caucasus, 
Eu citizens are not clearly informed outside of elite circles. 
The lack of information inherent in member states is also reflect-
ed in Turkey. Pre-accession debate on the Eu is almost non-existent 
in Turkey, and since the AkP government has not been very active 
15 güngör, Bahar. “Turkey Fears Anti Turkish Campaign Before Eu Ele-
ctions 2009”, deutsche Welle: 2008 and katrin Bennhold. “sarkozy’s 
Question: Who is European?”, international herald Tribune: 8 septem-
ber 2006. 
16 see further http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2005-10-04-kaya-en.html.
17 see further http://www.euractiv.com/en/opinion/turkey-eu-public-thinks/
article-171187.
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in implementing the necessary reforms in the last two years, it is be-
coming more and more difficult to convince Turkish public opinion 
of the need for further reforms. support for a pro-Eu government is 
necessary for the continuation of the accession process, and there-
fore platforms for the exchange of ideas and views that will create 
public consensus on the Eu should be established by policy-makers. 
This is also evident in the backlash in public opinion, the only topic 
discussed about the Eu and Turkey’s membership being the open-
endedness of the negotiation process. 
Every statement by Eu leaders has different repercussions in the 
Turkish media. speeches that would not be of that much impor-
tance in Eu member states or in European media, sometimes grab 
the headlines in Turkey. in other words, public opinion is molded 
through these reflections in the media. As is to be expected, this 
has many repercussions for Turkey’s Eu accession process and the 
Eu’s image in Turkey. First of all, Turkish public opinion reacts very 
quickly to negative news because of the inherent lack of trust in the 
Eu.18 The quick and intense reaction on the Turkish side is a result of 
a sensitivity that has formed in the Turkish public because of the vol-
ume of criticism delivered by the Eu -- many times on just grounds 
but also quite often using obvious double standards. Following upon 
this, an Eu image that has been already formed and gives a negative 
impression is strengthened and, as time passes, it becomes more dif-
ficult to break this stereotype. This is automatically reflected in the 
elections and the internal political situation, as the incumbent party 
will be seeking reelection and, public opinion being negative, the po-
litical parties will drop their Eu aspirations. it therefore it becomes 
more and more difficult for pro-EU politicians to defend their points 
while negative messages are transmitted to Turkish public opinion 
through the media. 
As a result, any statement made by an Eu leader gets more atten-
tion than it deserves in Turkey and helps to form opinion about the 
Eu and the accession process. since most statements that get enough 
attention to be published are anti-Turkey statements, public opinion 
lacks the information that is necessary to support reforms. This puts 
the current government in a really difficult situation, as it wants to 
be reelected and hence acts according to the dynamics of internal 
politics. 
18 see Williams and Associates, “survey of Turkish Public opinion, march 
29 – April 14 2008”, international republican institute, 21.07.2008.
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Another fear that dominates the agendas of European leaders and 
media as well as having a significant influence on European public 
opinion is related to population numbers in Turkey. The French in 
particular believe19 that their country is losing its role as an impor-
tant and strong member within the union due to the last enlarge-
ment wave in 2004 and that if Turkey enters the union, this would 
further weaken its influence. According to this argument it is es-
timated that by the time Turkey becomes a full member its popu-
lation20 will exceed 80 million. in that case, Turkey would surpass 
germany with the biggest21 population in Europe, which would com-
plicate things further. This has already ignited many discussions 
about institutionalization in Europe and the power structure within 
those institutions. since this would add up to Turkey’s sending the 
largest number of mEPs to the European Parliament and obtaining 
a dominant position in the Council, it has become even more diffi-
cult to convince European public opinion.
too important a neighborhood
one of the most praised matters that seem to have become more 
of an asset than a challenge in Turkey-Eu relations is Turkey’s bi-
lateral relations with its neighbors. As Turkey continues its efforts 
for the normalization of relations with Armenia, the intensified ex-
change of diplomatic dialogue between the two countries further re-
flects Turkey’s commitment to contribute to regional stabilization in 
the Caucasus as well as its consistent policy of rapprochement with 
its neighbors. 
The recent rapprochement started with president gül’s visit to 
yerevan and went further with the invitation of president sarkisy-
an to Ankara. moreover, civil society dialogue continues between 
the two countries as an example of second track diplomacy. TEsEv 
has recently organized a conference in yerevan on Turkey-Armenia 
19 see http://www.euractiv.com/en/opinion/turkey-eu-public-thinks/artic-
le-171187.
20 For population demographics of Turkey see http://www.tuik.gov.tr/Pre-
Tablo.do?tb_id=39&tb_adi=n%C3%BCfus%20%C4%B0statistikleri%20
ve%20Projeksiyonlar&ust_id=11. last updated 31.12.2007.





relations in collaboration with the Caucasus media institute based 
in yerevan22. during the TEsEv workshop in yerevan the latest de-
velopments in Turkey-Armenia relations were analyzed and the for-
eign policy priorities of both countries were discussed, including 
the karabakh and Cyprus questions. This workshop aimed to have 
a positive effect on the civil society dialogue that has been initiated 
between the two countries.23 Among the other examples of dialogue 
between the two countries, one can also speak of cultural and social 
activities including both sides’ hosting performances by artists from 
the other country. 
it may seem as if public opinion has seriously declined on both 
sides for Turkish membership; it should, however, be taken into ac-
count that public opinion statistics were lower in 2004 when com-
pared with recent polls and even today there is some indication that 
support is still going up, although it fluctuates from time to time.24 
Turkey and the European union may not be on the best terms at the 
moment with regard to discussions, but it is of the utmost impor-
tance that the AkP government takes up the reforms from where it 
has left off and get back on track. it should be stressed at this point 
that Turkish public opinion is still interested in Eu membership. 
moreover, even though the progress report does point to restric-
tions and limited progress in certain key areas as well as make further 
calls upon the Turkish government to implement the reforms they 
have adopted in a legal framework, still Turkey has shown significant 
progress in certain problem areas and expressed further commit-
ment to follow up on those areas where progress has been limited or 
nonexistent. Turkey’s alignment with common foreign and security 
policy declarations further showed its commitment to become a part 
of the union. one of the concrete examples of this alignment, which 
is reflected in the 2008 Progress Report, is Turkey’s efforts for the 
middle East peace process. in the last year, the Turkish government 
has taken up the role of negotiator between israel and syria while try-
ing to bring together the leaders of the middle East for further talks. 
Turkish foreign policy is strictly aligned with Eu policies towards the 
22 see further www.tesev.org.tr.
23 see further www.tesev.org.tr
24 see further http://209.85.129.132/search?q=cache:lh4kirssfQgJ:www.iri.org
/europe/turkey/pdfs/2008%2520July%252021%2520survey%2520o-
f%2520Turkish%2520Public%2520opinion,%2520march%252029-A-
pr i l%252014,%252020 0 8.pdf+Turkish+Publ ic+opinion+sur-
veys+2008&hl=tr&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=tr.
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middle East, and this was discussed in detail in the progress report. 
it should be noted however that as Turkey tries to prepare its own 
public opinion for membership, parallel efforts have to be shown on 
the side of the European union so that the public in Europe can be 
prepared for Turkish membership. it should be clearly noted that, 
although there are problems that relate to Turkey’s accession, the 
current situation is not as negative and as doubtful as some in Eu-
rope may claim.
On a final note, after the declaration that was released by the Euro-
pean Council on december 8, the process of negotiation with Turkey 
and Croatia in 2008 was discussed. With respect to Turkey’s acces-
sion process, the Council expressed its welcome for the Turkish gov-
ernment’s commitment to advance the necessary reforms, they also 
however highlighted their disappointment about the limited prog-
ress in political reforms. one of the most striking points that were 
emphasized in the declaration was the classification of the need for 
Turkey to normalize relations with greece and Cyprus as “urgent”. in 
a nutshell, the Council was more critical of Turkey’s position in the 
negotiation process than was the Commission in the progress report. 
While the emphasis was on political reforms in the progress report, 
in the Council declaration a significant share was given to the Cy-
prus issue and the limited progress in the normalization of relations 
with the republic of Cyprus and greece. it was clearly expressed 
that a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem and a commit-
ment to implement the necessary reforms will determine the future 
of Turkey’s accession process. in this respect, Turkey needs to clearly 
express its belief in a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem 
while reminding the Eu about its commitments in regard to it. it 
should not be forgotten that it is only through a constructive ap-
proach and a full commitment from all parties that a solution to the 
Cyprus problem can be found. Therefore the Eu and Turkey acting 
together in the negotiation process going on in Cyprus and support 
for both Turkish and greek Cypriots would be vital for the continua-
tion of the talks between the two communities. 
it is certain that the year 2009 will serve as a milestone of Turkey-
Eu relations. The disappointment expressed in the Council declara-
tion with regard to political reforms and its description of the need 
to solve the problems with Cyprus as “urgent”, especially given the 
fact that Turkey can hardly take any unilateral step towards a Cy-
prus settlement, underlines the risk of further dragging out of the 
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negotiations. however, it must be emphasized that for Europe the 
costs of losing Turkey are substantial as well.25 The repercussions of 
suspending and even dragging out negotiations with Turkey will not 
only be economic losses for the Eu but will also serve as a political 
message to the islamic world that a muslim country is not compat-
ible with the values of the European union. in Turkey’s case, the 
Council declaration should not be taken as the only reference point. 
The issues that have created the current disappointment on the side 
of the Eu have also been up to a point created by Turkey-skeptic Eu 
states as well as by the demotivation caused by german and French 
opposition to Turkey’s membership and the position of the Eu on 
the Cyprus issue.26 
moreover, Turkey’s position in key foreign policy issues should 
also be taken into consideration as it is mostly complementary to the 
position of the Eu. At this point in time when Turkey-Eu relations 
are rather up in the air, both parties should work towards their prom-
ises, whether it be Turkey’s implementing the reforms necesssary to 
being a part of the Eu or the Eu’s showing its commitment to lifting 
the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots. These small steps are 
actually going to determine the future of Turkey’s accession process 
and show both parties’ commitment to move together to solve the 
issues of common interest. 









talkIng turkey  
In slovakIa: 
In searCh oF the 
proper Cure For an 
unCertaIn dIagnosIs
luCiA nAJšlová
“And to conclude, i would like to apologize to all Turks for what i thought about them before,” wrote one of my col-lege students, as part of the conclusion of a paper sub-
mitted three years ago. My first reaction when grading the paper of 
course was: a stylistic lapse, things like this might belong in an essay 
but hardly in an academic paper supposed to be focusing on a spe-
cific aspect of the Turkey-EU conundrum. In a few seconds I realized 
that what i had just seen was in fact wonderful. For this (and in fact 
the content of most papers i received) points to something very en-
couraging: once people are engaged in a fact based discussion, asked 
to look for evidence and question what they have held for years to 
be indisputable truths, then it is not so difficult to strip the public 
debate of mythology. one does not need to apply any super-secret 
methodology to achieve this. For a while i indulged myself in the 
idea that a simple training in argumentation might be just the miss-
ing piece of the puzzle we need to put in place in order to have 
a more informed public, demanding more reasonable policies.
i do not intend in this article to elaborate on whether Turkey and 
the European union have common interests – i consider it as a given 
that they do. Neither shall I write about specific areas of these in-
terests or about where the negotiations stand at the moment and 
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why this is not benefiting either of the two. Although I originally 
intended to contribute to this volume with a study on communica-
tion aspects of the Eu-Turkey relationship, in the process of writing 
something kept tapping on my shoulder telling me that a more per-
sonal contribution might be refreshing. i decided to go along with 
it. I shall rather share a few reflections of a practitioner, trying to 
bring the complex narrative of Turkey and “Europe” into the public 
discourse of a small post-communist state.
The opening anecdote about the student is an encouraging one, 
but moments of optimism in the realm of Eu-Turkey relations are 
unfortunately scarce. To illustrate just how complex “talking Tur-
key” in slovakia might be, allow me opening number two. A few 
months ago i was taking a Turkish friend to a wine-tasting in a small 
town near Bratislava. We got on a local train that i had not taken for 
ages and i was not sure at which station to get off. A couple of coun-
trywomen were in the compartment with us, so i asked one of them 
for directions, switching from an English conversation to slovak. 
An expression ran across her face that usually appears when people 
suddenly solve a mystery that has been occupying their minds for 
a while: “so you are slovak – we were wondering which of you two 
is English!” i smiled and replied “Actually, neither.” “how come?” 
the woman went on, “which language were you speaking then? i am 
sure it was not german… But you know, what do i know ... in our 
times we had to learn only russian”. i said “she’s Turkish.” “That 
can’t be,” reacted the woman immediately. “Where is the veil?” i was 
not surprised, only entertained and i went on with the usual “Tur-
key for beginners” – saying that not everyone in Turkey wears a veil 
and there is a considerable difference between Turkey and saudi 
Arabia for example. At the same time I tried to briefly translate 
the conversation for my friend. she laughed (and she too was not 
surprised) and asked me to tell the woman that “you know, many 
in my country would actually like to see me veiled”. i tried hard to 
find a few accurate sentences that would grasp Turkey’s complexity, 
but unfortunately, the conversation could not continue, as we had 
to disembark from the train. 
For a few days following this encounter i wondered how this con-
versation would have continued had we had a couple of hours jour-
ney ahead. sooner or later, i am sure, we would have got to a broader 
discussion of women rights – somehow always the first topic when 
talking about the “muslim world”. Then we would proceed with the 
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news coverage from “that part of the world” – (call it the middle East) 
– terrorists, shooting, kidnapping, poverty and scarcity, in short, 
nothing positive. maybe we would stumble over the image of otto-
mans (here always referred to as “the Turks”) in slovak national(ist) 
historiography and literature – plundering barbarians mostly. And 
maybe she would say that anyway, Turkey and its likes are just so far 
away and working nine hours every day in a grocery store (and five 
more around the house) the only thing she is keen to do is to have 
a good sleep or watch a movie. Could we blame her? surely not. like 
many other slovaks, Central Europeans or Eu-peans in general, she 
is struggling with her own private life and big “politics” are just genu-
inely beyond her orbit. 
The public opinion polls tell us quite clearly that most Eu-peans 
are not keen to see the Turks as “one of us” – no matter whether the 
Turks will adopt so-called Eu standards. At the same time, more than 
one Eu-pean has a distinctly blurred and distorted vision of who 
the Turks are and what they want. Contrary to the general percep-
tions, there is more than one reason why Turks and Eu-peans should 
look for ways to find a common communication frequency. It might 
though be very useful, if in parallel to finding frequency with Turkey 
EU elites would strive to find a common frequency with EU citizens. 
As is evident from the two stories sketched above, it somehow would 
be more desirable if our public debate on foreign policy were driven 
more by people who have information, as opposed to those depending 
on twisted accounts of Europe’s “others”. But such a public arena will 
most probably not emerge bottom up, i.e. it is unlikely that people who 
have so far ignored the facts or have not had access to them will sponta-
neously rise and search the libraries. it is the responsibility of the elites 
of every country to facilitate the creation of forums for open exchange.
the beginnings
When we were starting in 2004-2005 with colleagues from the 
Turkish think tank TEsEv and later also with ones from the Turk-
ish daily news (now hurriyet daily news and Economic review) to 
ponder what we can do jointly between Turkey and slovakia, the 
atmosphere was much different from what it is now in 2009. The 
European Council was about to say yes to the opening of accession 
negotiations, many in Turkey were enthusiastic. in the Eu of that 
time, “enlargement fatigue” was not yet such a specter. 
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We wanted to facilitate a more informed expert and public de-
bate on Turkey in slovakia – at a time when more myths than facts 
were surrounding Turkey and its accession prospects. The usual “too 
big, too poor, too muslim” completely overruled “European interest” 
in the debates, and the reasons why the European Council decided 
to open accession negotiations with Turkey remained unknown to 
most. 
meanwhile many things have happened. soon after the opening 
of accession negotiations (2005) they were suspended (2006), and 
more than one Eu leader has voiced stronger and stronger concerns 
over Turkey’s capacity to fulfill the criteria of accession. In fact, the 
Turkosceptics are rarely so concrete as to refer to accession criteria 
– for most it suffices to declare that Turkey is simply not a European 
country and imply that to debate its tentative membership is a waste 
of time. 
And just as the debate on Turkey in top European political circles 
was subsumed to the mood of doom, so were our think-tank debates: 
from the enthusiastic conviction that all that needed to be defeated 
was ignorance on the side of “ordinary people” we came to be more 
reluctant. The umbrella of “Finding Common grounds” that became 
a label for our meetings – not ignoring the different, but rather focus-
ing on what we have in common – did not run out of ideas (we gener-
ated many). But we slowed down a bit in activity and took some time 
for reflection. Though I cherish the belief that civil society organiza-
tions can make a difference, i doubt, that they can do so unless the 
ideas generated by them become part of nationwide policies. That 
is in fact evident in the story of Central Europe itself – and slovakia 
especially – in the tough times after the fall of the communist regime, 
civil society organizations gave birth to a number of innovative ideas. 
But change was achieved only when these ideas were taken up by 
policy-makers, who then “changed the system”. This however does 
not seem to be happening when it comes to our country’s (and the 
Eu’s) policies vis-à-vis Turkey. it is essential to talk and to meet, but 
it can become frustrating if there is no “tangible achievement”.
Can think tanks make a differenCe?
When think-tankers meet, the very first thing they come up with 
is a workshop, a conference, or a policy brief. And we did some, 
and they generated a number of interesting thoughts and established 
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many productive contacts. it is hard to evaluate whether we achieved 
a policy change. in the big picture we most probably did not. slo-
vakia (and perhaps Central Europe on the whole, with maybe the 
exception of Poland) are not among the priority targets of Turkish 
foreign policy. similarly, relations with Turkey and its Eu integration 
prospects don’t seem to be a foreign policy priority in our region. 
The Central European think tanks can and should – at most – try 
to lobby their governments into not being negative when it comes to 
Turkey’s accession and into engaging in curriculum change so that 
their respective societies would be more cognizant of things Euro-
pean. The frustrating thing about the first task is that most probably 
these countries will not be the proponents of a “Turkey in Eu” policy 
– although it would be nice if they were. in fact, small countries, 
which for example slovakia is, could indulge in the luxury of having 
a principled foreign policy and establish a group of countries that 
would counter the loud “Turco-doubtful” bloc notoriously led by the 
French president and german Chancellor. But somehow this idea 
has not acquired traction. 
one might think that this is because slovakia’s capacities for 
know-how about other countries are limited, and that prevents de-
velopment of a deeper policy debate. But more than once it has hap-
pened that even if world-class people are brought here to discuss 
issues on which there is not enough domestic expertise, our policy 
makers do not miss a chance to miss a chance. A good example is 
a conference we organized in June 2009 – with panels focused on 
Tr-Eu negotiations and Cyprus, the Black sea, Turkey and the Eu’s 
Eastern policy, and the Eu and Turkey in the middle East. At least 
one of these issues belongs to the top three priorities of our foreign 
policy. While the conference had a nice attendance from diplomatic 
corps accredited in slovakia (including ambassadors who, one might 
think, should pragmatically be less interested in some of the issues 
than slovak diplomats), only one representative of the mFA bothered 
to come. The rest were obviously busy. 
regarding the second task for think tanks, feeding public de-
bate and contributing to education, here i must admit that this is 
a realm quite underestimated by many in our ranks. Activities for 
“invitees only” take precedence over activities aimed to involve larger 
segments of society. And while many think-tankers are involved in 
teaching at universities or occasionally “the high school circuit” with 
lectures, the know-how potential of our experts is still not exploited 
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sufficiently to generate bottom-up demand for a more responsible 
policy. given the ignorance of many decision-makers when it comes 
to responsible policies vis-à-vis Turkey, it is in fact surprising that we 
have not invested more effort in education and creating more bottom 
up demand for reasonable policies.
still, Turkey does receive considerable moral support from the 
Eu-pean think-tank sphere. in fact, think tanks are substituting for 
some Eu governments, consistently honoring the pacta sunt servan-
da principle. You will hardly find an article or policy brief arguing 
against membership. At the same time, Turkey does receive much 
more attention than many other countries that might in fact be easier 
to swallow for the Eu or at least not be so divisive an issue when it 
comes to public opinion. 
in the fall of 2008 our partner institute Europeum was organizing 
a conference in Prague on the eve of the Czech presidency. one of the 
five panels was dealing exclusively with Turkey. Given the number of 
challenges facing the Eu at that time and the ailing state of talks with 
Turkey, this was a big thing. As a macedonian analyst remarked in the 
corridors of Černín palace where the conference was held, “Turkey is 
lucky to have all this support.” i retorted that obviously “all this sup-
port” was not leading anywhere at the moment, when key Eu states 
seemed to be ignoring the recommendations of most Eu think tanks, 
be it big or small. he smiled and responded: “sure, and can you imag-
ine how much worse it could have been if you had not kept the issue 
on the table?” he was probably right – it could be much worse. 
This strong support is suspicious to some though. one scholar 
dealing with the economics of post-communist states recently re-
marked in an off-the-record conversation that he thought that almost 
all analysts and academics were “pro Eu membership for Turkey”, 
because it was “politically correct” and they were afraid to write any-
thing else. Well, this remark is still a mystery to me – a conspiracy of 
academics? Cooking up fake facts and figures? To what end? But this 
scholar had to be credited with one thing – really, there is rarely such 
a topic in academia/the think-tankosphere on which there would be 
such a rare consensus as there is on Turkey-Eu. i also keep wonder-
ing how it is possible that we have such a discrepancy between what 
academics and pundits write and policy-makers do – especially when 
we see that it is less so when it comes to other matters. The primary 
role of think tanks is indeed to generate ideas and suggest policy al-
ternatives and in many other issues they are much more successful.
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But think-tankers’ consensus is obviously not enough. As foreign 
policy increasingly rises from smoke-filled diplomatic closets and 
gets to be decided more and more on the street, the messages should 
somehow be brought “to the people”. Are the think tanks just too 
detached? should our hopes for a balanced and informed debate rest 
mainly with the media?
will the media do the magiC?
Communicating “things European” certainly is a challenge. one of 
the biggest questions in Europe today is how to close the gap between 
the declared, the implemented, and the felt. The “European interest” 
standing so proudly on paper in so many European documents sim-
ply does not translate into Eu citizens’ behavior or even thinking. re-
member the woman on the train? Just like millions of other Eu-peans, 
be they “new” or “old”, she will not go online and check government 
policies and party programs even when it comes to things more di-
rectly related to her life, not to speak of foreign policy related issues.
As most numbers show, she is most likely to get most of her infor-
mation about the outside world from Tv. david Judson in this vol-
ume writes that foreign media have five basic narratives about Turkey 
– Turks vs. kurds; Armenian genocide; honor killings; free speech 
and islam vs. secularism. To these narratives, let me add a few re-
marks on the perspective from which it is not uncommon for many 
mainstream media to approach Turkey-related topics.
First, in the eyes of Eu-peans, Turkey is a periphery – although 
portrayed as “the most progressive” “middle Eastern” country, still one 
that wants to reform itself according to a “European model”. hence it 
is portrayed as being in a situation inferior to the rest of Europe. sec-
ond, it is an exotic periphery – most Eu-peans like exotic stuff only on 
holiday (if they do at all), once a year, for two weeks at most. 
Third, Turkey is a problem. Following the golden rule of “good 
news is no news”, Turkey will mostly pop up on your Tv screen 
when something “interesting” is happening there. This should not 
surprise us and it is unlikely to change any time soon. Just try a ran-
dom press scan with the keyword Turkey. or google the word– after 
a number of pages showing Turkey as an ideal holiday destination 
we get to news articles where some of the other keywords will be 
“conflict”, “struggle” and their synonyms. Most probably, this is not 
going to change and any attempt to do so would be a fool’s errand. 
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At the same time, Turkey is merely one of many issues on the current 
EU-pean agenda and media just reflect this – sometimes in a balanced, 
sometimes in a biased way. Where think tanks can however be useful 
is in engaging in deep debate with journalists. While most of the latter 
are unlikely to show up at a seminar/workshop organized in Bratislava 
(foreign news desks are usually understaffed and editors usually will not 
let them out for longer than an interview or a news conference), it is not 
so difficult to bring them out of the country – we did this a couple of 
times as part of FCg and i would say it was a very successful endeavor. 
The thing is that usually think-tank and journalistic debate in slo-
vakia – unlike in Turkey – go in parallel and rarely meet. sure, there 
are a number of off-the-record coffee/beer meetings, when journal-
ists/politicians/think-tankers exchange views, but these talks rarely 
happen in a semi-formal round table, especially when it comes to 
talking about foreign policy. how formal/semi-formal debates usu-
ally happen is that when some issue arises a journalist calls his/her 
fellow think-tanker and asks for comment or background informa-
tion on the current issue. i have seen much less journalist-think-
tanker-politician round table in slovakia than i have in Turkey. 
so we tried it in FCg – inviting journalists along to debate (not 
only to cover, to debate!) and some fruitful exchanges were started and 
some more balanced articles were written. i would like to highlight 
that such roundtables have the capacity to create a very construc-
tive atmosphere, since the academicians/analysts have to drop their 
usual “journalists just distort the reality” and the journalists know 
the debate would not get very far if they stayed with the usual cliché 
that “academics just speak in a manner too complicated and incom-
prehensible to ‘ordinary people’”. sitting at one table, with a given 
topic, they have the opportunity to engage in discussing the lim-
its and opportunities of their professions in contributing to a more 
open debate in their respective countries.
After one such event slovak news Tv even covered the event itself 
– i could not believe my ears when a journalist called me to come and 
explain why the workshop was happening etc. usually we go there to 
comment on election results etc, and it would never have occurred to 
me that a boutique workshop can make it to the opening interview 
and story of a weekly foreign policy compendium, when larger con-
ferences sometimes cannot – because they are simply not considered 
events. And yes, we sat there in a studio, discussing the importance 
of communication, erasing stereotypes, learning etc. 
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While a few informed individual journalists can (and do) make 
a difference, media as such cannot be expected to fulfill the role an 
educational system should. And here we get to a more optimistic 
story briefly hinted at in the introduction. 
mainstreaming tUrkey
recall the girl from the opening of this essay “apologizing” to 
all Turks, one of those who give me optimism about the future of 
European politics. The interesting thing was however that she did 
not come out with this knowledge from an Eu integration or Turkey 
focused course. no, it was a simple freshman “Academic communica-
tion” course, considered as a “boring must” in the Anglo-saxon edu-
cation system. yet it was unfortunately a very new thing in slovakia. 
The department of European studies at FsEs Comenius university 
in Bratislava is a relatively new one. But it became among the first in 
slovakia to introduce a course focused on writing and speaking, and 
it is still among the few exceptions. 
With Peter Dráľ, a friend and colleague working in Milan’s Šimečka 
Foundation (an ngo doing mostly human rights education) we de-
veloped a syllabus and decided from the outset to introduce a bit of 
experimental learning. We didn’t simply want the students to learn 
the technique and the “proper structure” of a paper, how to cite and 
which words to avoid. We wanted to teach them how to “get into” the 
writing/speaking process, think critically and express themselves. 
We wanted them to know why they were using certain sources and 
certain arguments. since we both are former journalists, we thought 
that the best way to achieve this would be if from the beginning the 
students were to work on one “story” and learn about its characters, 
plot and nuances. We split the course into two groups and asked 
them to sign up, at the very first class, for either “Roma in Slovakia” 
(one of the challenging topics of domestic politics) or the “Turkey 
and Eu” topic. They were supposed to learn their writing and speak-
ing basics on one of these two stories.
many friends and colleagues asked us if we were serious, whether 
this wasn’t going to be too much, too difficult, when the students had 
absolutely no background in these topics. Well, we had doubts too, 
but we decided to hit the road anyway and the process and results 
were fascinating. i believe they brought more lasting results than 
most of the work we ever achieved for so-called “expert audiences”. 
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i will not elaborate here on everything that we experienced in the 
three years we were teaching this course – the struggles about work-
load, accuracy, validity of sources and plagiarism (yes, a frequent 
phenomenon). it would be the subject of a different article, since the 
slovak education system still suffers from many ills of the previous 
era. But let me emphasize that we engaged in hours of fruitful de-
bates on “culture”, “islam”, “European”, “tradition”, “value”, “inter-
est”. All these words or concepts that seem to have such clear mean-
ing became subject to detailed deconstruction. And it was amazing 
to observe how in a few months of these debates people, most of 
whom did not have the slightest idea about what is happening be-
tween the Eu and Turkey, came up with contributions, papers and 
observations that sometimes do not occur to many people paid to 
deal with Eu politics. 
And this i believe is the key to the question of making the Eu-Tur-
key debate less about mythology and more about facts and figures. If 
we are able to reform our education systems so they are more open 
to debate and also deal with current issues, then we can have a more 
healthy society and do not have to lament “misguided” public opin-
ion. But can we achieve this in a country that is still looking more 
inward than around?
or, not jUst tUrkey
Perhaps this essay should have started with listing all the reasons 
why Central Europe should care and which comparative advantages 
it possesses that make it a likely champion of responsible European 
policies and politics. unfortunately, our awareness of our responsi-
bilities (and possibilities) seems to be low and this is a crucial prob-
lem to be addressed by policy-makers and intellectuals in our geo-
graphical space. 
one facet of this could be grasped as a schizophrenia between the 
on-the-record “yes, we can” and the off-the record “Are you crazy? 
of course we can’t”. on the one hand, documents abound speaking 
of our global responsibilities and potential to deal with them, on 
the other hand, more than one policy-maker will scorn the idea that 
these should be followed by real actions or, more importantly, that 
real actions pursued by an entity with slovakia’s leverage will indeed 
make any difference. Definitely, the rhetoric and actions of the big 
might make a bigger difference, but then, something is wrong with 
101
the world order of nation states. Why don’t we just pick 10 relevant 
countries and make the rest their dominions? Absurd? sure, but that 
is exactly the message sent by proponents of “no, we can’t.” sadly 
enough, one can hear this attitude from people of all classes and 
types of education. The complex of inferiority seems to be deeply 
entrenched in slovakia. 
Another element is that of catching up with the “West”, though 
not so much in freedoms as in indulgence. Contrary to what many 
might have thought (the books about post-Communist countries have 
stressed more “newly found freedoms” than “newly found wealth”), 
it is material deprivation that many people, even 20 years after the 
fall of the Iron Curtain, would like to remedy first. Then, it might 
be a misnomer to say that Central Europe turned from unfree to 
free. rather it turned from poor to wealth-seeking. And while many 
reforms were accomplished since the change of regime 20 years ago, 
the realm where we still have to catch up is education. Though there 
are more and more exceptions, the schools through which most peo-
ple pass, do not give them an opportunity to learn/adopt “life skills” 
but instead force them to memorize things they will never ever use. 
outdated methodology and often unrevised content every year pro-
duce tens of thousand of people who do not want to have anything 
to do with education after they pass the compulsory core.
And while non-post-communist Europe often suffers from similar 
ills when it comes to public debate, in the case of Central Europe 
i believe we had the advantage of a big reform momentum that un-
fortunately was not (thus far) used to its own potential. until we opt 
for a major change in the system of education, i fear that in the near 
future we will be reading very gloomy articles about the state of Eu-
rope. But if we try, the results might be better than expected. Thus, 
talking Turkey in slovakia is more about slovakia than about Tur-
key. Trying to understand this might offer some relief to the Turkish 
public and/or policy-makers. The negative messages and widespread 
ignorance are not mainly a reflection of “how Turkey is” or what we 
think of it, but, they are a mirror of who we are, how we here in Cen-
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